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ABSTRACT
Khern-am-nuai, Warut PhD, Purdue University, December 2016. Essays on Value
Creation in Online Marketplaces. Major Professor: Karthik Kannan.
This dissertation consists of three essays that study the transformative impact
of new information technologies under three specific contexts using both empirical
and theoretical approaches. Chapter 2 examines the online review system, which is
the new type of information technology that replaces the traditional word-of-mouth
communication. Particularly, we study the practice of the platform owner that uses
monetary incentives to attract reviewers. The research problem is important as firms,
which seek to strengthen their online review platforms, have considered various forms
of incentives, including extrinsic rewards, to encourage users to write reviews. We
encountered a natural experiment design where one review platform suddenly started
offering monetary incentives for writing reviews. Along with data from Amazon.com
and using the difference-in-differences approach, we compare the quantity and quality
of reviews before and after rewards were introduced in the treated platform. We find
that reviews are significantly more positive but the quality decreases. Taking advantage of the panel data, we also evaluate the effect of rewards on existing reviewers.
We find that their level of participation after monetary incentives decreases, but not
their quality of participation. Lastly, even though the platform enjoys an increase in
the number of new reviewers, disproportionately more reviews appear to be written
for highly rated products.
In Chapter 3, we investigate the economic implications of the new online communication system that has become increasing popular in recent years. This system
allows consumers to ask and answer questions regarding the products that are available on the platform. It typically co-exists with the standard online review system

x
where consumers share their own experience of the products. Although several websites adopt this Q&A system or even replace the standard review system with it, the
economic implications of such a Q&A system have not been studied in the previous
literature. We collected the data from two online shopping platforms and employed
the difference-in-differences approach to empirically examine the effect of question
& answer elements, which exist only on one platform, on product sales. Interestingly, we find that, controlling for everything else, question elements negatively affect
product sales while answer elements, particularly the depth of the answers, have a
positive impact on sales. However, as we focus on the initial sales, it turns out that
the number of questions and the fraction of questions that have at least one answer
positively influence the sales. We also find that there is an interaction between Q&A
elements and review elements, in that an increase in the number of questions seems to
be positively correlated with an increase in the number of reviews in the following period. Meanwhile, an increase in the number of answers appears to reduce the average
review length in the subsequent period. Our findings suggest that incorporating the
question & answer system could be a potential approach to drive sales. However, it is
crucially important for managers to develop appropriate policies to gather necessary
answers to questions asked on the platform in order to capitalize on such a system.
In Chapter 4, we provide an analysis of a two-sided platform, which becomes
a dominant framework adopted by new Information Technology platforms such as
Uber and Airbnb. We develop a game-theoretic model featuring a platform owner
who acts as an intermediary that services two types of users to examine the influence
of incentive policies the platform owner enforces. Specifically, our main interest is to
study the implication of the incentive policy on user behavior and welfare metrics. We
find that although the seller welfare always increases with the amount of incentives
given by the platform, an adjustment of the incentive allocation policy can also yield
similar results in many scenarios. In addition, there exists a case where the platform
can increase both the seller welfare and its own welfare without increasing the amount
of incentives.

1

1. INTRODUCTION
The online marketplaces in the United States have been in a fast-growing era for
the last few years. Statistics from the U.S. Department of Commerce show that the
market value grows to exceed 80 billion dollars in the first quarter of 2015, which represents 7 percent of all retail sales in the United States (DeNale and Weidenhamer,
2016). In addition, the structure of the market is also shifted from the large “horizontal” corporations such as Amazon, eBay, and Walmart to “vertical” products and
services such as Uber, Airbnb, and Fiverr in recent years (Laumeister, 2014). With
many success stories of the newcomers, the current state of online marketplaces is
increasingly fierce with competition. Yet, with uncomprehended potential value, the
market’s appeal is still inviting even more competition to the platform, causing players to struggle with policies and practices to keep current clientele while also catching
the attention of the new ones.
With such an intense competition, one of the most important questions managers
of online marketplaces face is how to create value on the platform. This dissertation
consists of three essays that study value creation practices in online marketplaces
under three specific contexts using both empirical and theoretical approaches. First,
we empirically study how monetary incentives affect an online review platform and
behavior of the reviewers in Chapter 2. We utilize data from two different review
platforms and two different timeframes. One review platform provides monetary
rewards to every reviewer who writes reviews on the platform in the second timeframe
while there is no such incentive in the first timeframe. On the other hand, another
review platform provides no monetary incentives in both timeframes. Our differencein-difference analysis shows that by providing monetary incentives, reviews are more
positive with less quality. In addition, we also find that existing reviewers who wrote
reviews before monetary incentives write significantly less often but no meaningful
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change in review length and quality is observed. Lastly, although the review platform
enjoys an increase in the number of new reviewers who register and contribute to the
platform, the majority of new reviews are written for only a small set of highly rated
products, creating a concentration bias to the review system.
Next, in Chapter 3, we investigate the value of a specific feature, which allows
consumers to ask and answer questions regarding products available on an online
shopping platform. This Q&A system co-exists with the standard online review
system where consumers share their own experience regarding the products. We
collect the data from two online shopping platforms. One platform provides only
the standard online review system while another platform provides both the review
system and the question and answer system. We allow review and Q&A elements
on one platform to affect sales on another platform and leverage the difference-indifference analysis to unveil the effect of the question and answer feature on sales.
We find that question and answer elements have a significant impact on product sales.
Controlling for all other factors, question elements appear to negatively affect sales,
especially for popular products. Meanwhile, answer elements seem to affect product
sales in a positive manner. Interestingly, although the number of questions hurts
product sales, the fraction of questions that have at least one answer has a positive
impact on sales. Furthermore, once we focus the analysis on only initial sales, it
turns out that the number of questions and the fraction of questions with at least one
answer both positively impact sales. We also find that an increase in the number of
questions tends to increase the number of reviews in the next period. Meanwhile, an
increase in the number of answers appears to reduce the average content word count
of reviews in the subsequent period.
In Chapter 4, we explore an implication of incentive policies in two-sided online
marketplaces where the platform services two types of consumers (e.g., eBay with
buyers and sellers). Specifically, our primary interest is to study how the incentive
policy that is determined by the platform changes user behavior and social welfare.
We find that although the platform can always increase the seller welfare by increasing
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the amount of incentive, the change in the incentive allocation policy can also be
implemented to achieve the similar outcome in many cases. Surprisingly, there exists
a situation where the platform can increase both the seller welfare and participation
quality without raising the amount of incentives.
Our research yields a significant contribution to both academic research and industry practice. Our works contribute to the literature in economics of information
systems, online reviews, crowdsourcing, and two-sided platform development. We
also provide insights into the effectiveness of monetary incentive programs in a specific context of an online review platform, and the economic value of the question and
answer feature with the presence of the standard online review system. Moreover, we
offer a formal analysis of the role of the incentive policies in two-sided platform development. These insights could help managers of the platforms to derive appropriate
policies to attain their desired result.

4

2. THE EFFECT OF MONETARY INCENTIVES ON
ONLINE REVIEWS
2.1

Introduction
The usefulness of an online review platform critically depends on being able to

capture user preferences accurately. Yet, previous literature has shown that online
reviews mainly capture extreme rather than moderate opinions (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Liu, 2006). One possible explanation is that reviewers incur costs for
providing reviews that outweigh the value generated from submitting moderate ones.
A natural way of overcoming the problem is to offer rewards so as to offset the potential cost. Historically, both product manufacturers (or service providers) such as
car rental agencies and hotels, and review platform owners such as Best Buy and
TripAdvisor have offered monetary incentives to attract reviewers. In this paper, we
study the implications of monetary rewards offered by companies that own the review
platforms.
The question we seek to address in this paper is relevant since using monetary
rewards to draw reviewers to review platforms has become a common practice among
many firms in recent years. Yet, little analysis has been done thus far on the implications of such rewards in the context of online reviews. Note that if a product
manufacturer is the entity who provides incentives, it is fairly straightforward to expect biases toward positive reviews. For example, Chen and Xie (2005) show that the
manufacturer has an incentive to induce such behavior.1 However, when the review
1

Some effort has been made to curb incentives for reviews from the product manufacturer or service
provider. For instance, the Office of Fair Trading, which is the UK consumer protection agency, has
issued an official statement against the use of monetary incentives. The statement emerged from an
incident involving a high-end English hotel named “The Cove” offering a future discount to guests
who post a review of it on TripAdvisor. We acknowledge that the policy might be aimed at the quid
pro quo arrangement between the hotel and the guests.
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platform offers incentives, the outcome may not be as apparent. Specifically, it is not
clear whether the incentives simply reduce the participation cost and thus allow the
platform to capture the true perceptions of the population or whether they induce
biases such as warm glow or indirect reciprocity that again will not lead to capturing
true perceptions. In addition, writing reviews is an inherently intrinsically-motivated
task. Prior research has shown that introducing extrinsic rewards, when behavior is
primarily driven by intrinsic motivation could lead to weaker engagement (e.g., Kreps,
1997; Deci et al., 1999).
The interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations differ depending on
the contexts and the incentive mechanism design. For example, prior IS research has
considered participation in discussion forums and knowledge management systems
and has identified conflicting results (e.g., Liu et al., 2014; Hsieh et al., 2010). One
of the factors that decides the outcome in the discussion forum context is whether
the rewards are designed to be based on the quality of the answers or not. It is not
clear if the insights from discussion forums carry over to the review platform structure. In the review context, platforms employ three different approaches regarding
monetary incentives. The first approach is used by platforms such as Amazon which
generally do not provide explicit incentives to write reviews. The second approach
is used by platforms such as Best Buy, Rakuten, and K-Mart which provide rewards
simply based on the number of reviews written. This incentive mechanism has become a common practice among the review platforms offering extrinsic rewards in
recent years. The third approach is performance-based – for example, at some point,
Epinions provided rewards depending on the quality of the reviews written. In this
paper, we only analyze the second type of reward mechanism. For the third type,
we considered Epinions as a platform to analyze. However, since Epinions had attempted to operationalize several reward-for-reviews mechanisms over the years, we
neither have the details of the various mechanisms they tried, nor could we map the
timelines to the mechanisms. Moreover, Epinions has been effectively shut down since
March 2014 (old reviews are still available online). Other than Epinions, we could
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not find any other review platform that offers a broad variety of products and also
provides incentives based on review quality. It is likely because the implementation
of the third type is operationally difficult. Thus, our objective in this paper is to
formally analyze how the widely adopted incentive structure changes the nature of
the reviews and the level of participation and engagement amongst the intrinsically
motivated reviewers.
In this paper, we take advantage of an exogenous change in a certain review
platform, and employ a natural experiment research design. On April 13, 2013, an
online review platform, henceforth the treated platform, introduced a program to
encourage reviewers by giving them monetary rewards for eligible reviews submitted.
Based on our discussions with the platform, no other major changes that could affect
reviewer behavior were introduced around that time. Moreover, the change only
affected the treated platform and reviews on this platform. Also, to the best of our
knowledge, the change was not announced in advance to the users which gives us
a clear point in time when the treatment was initiated. Dunning (2012) defines a
natural experiment as an observational setting where causes are randomly, or as good
as randomly, assigned among some set of units. Consistent with that definition, this
setting is a perfect candidate for a natural experiment research design. To study the
effect of the treatment, we also need a valid control group which is not exposed to
the treatment. We chose Amazon.com as the control platform, since it has one of the
largest and most reputable review platforms and it did not have a monetary incentive
program before or after the treatment.
We match products in the treated platform with those in the control platform
and use the difference-in-differences approach to compare the reviews in the two
platforms before and after treatment. We find that after monetary incentives are
introduced, reviews on the treated platform are significantly more positive while the
quality drastically goes down. Our findings imply that monetary incentives are not
simply reducing the costs of review writing, and indirect reciprocity induced by the
monetary rewards seems to be an important factor driving reviewer behavior. We
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followed up on the initial analysis by examining how existing reviewers in the treated
platform, who may be considered intrinsically motivated, behave as a consequence of
the rewards. We find that even though existing reviewers write reviews significantly
less often, they do not appear to reduce the depth and quality of their reviews – at
least, there was no statistically significant difference in the review length and review
helpfulness before and after the incentives. From the platform’s standpoint, even
though the platform enjoys an increase in the number of new reviewers who registered and contributed to the platform after monetary incentives, the platform suffers
from review concentration bias, since reviews after the incentives are disproportionately written for highly rated products. Moreover, most of the low-rated products
receive higher star ratings. As a result, the distribution of star ratings becomes more
skewed to the positive extremity, implying that platform-level bias exacerbates with
the introduction of monetary incentives.
In the next section, we review the literature related to our study, and in section
2.3 we develop our hypotheses. Section 2.4 discusses the data used for the empirical
analysis. In section 2.5, we introduce the empirical strategy employed in our study
and present a discussion of the results of our econometric analysis of product reviews
and review platforms. In section 2.6, we summarize the implications of our study
and present the conclusions of our research and its limitations, along with potential
directions for future research.

2.2

Literature Review
A wide array of studies on review systems is available not only in the information

systems domain, but also in psychology, economics, computer science, and marketing.
This domain also relates to prior works on traditional word-of-mouth effects (e.g.,
Bansal and Voyer, 2000; Grewal et al., 2003). However, online reviews have been
recognized to be different in that they have a distinct set of features that traditional
word-of-mouth lacks. For one, online reviews are available for an indefinite period
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of time. Also, the platform owner can control which reviews to display. In addition,
online review systems typically allow readers to search and filter reviews they want
to read. In the specific context of online reviews, we first seek to understand the
importance and impact of different review elements and characteristics on review
systems by surveying the literature that studies the impact of online review elements
on consumer behavior.

2.2.1

Impact of Review Elements on Consumer Behavior

In this subsection, we discuss only a few papers that are most relevant to our
analysis. Interested readers can refer to Babić Rosario et al. (2016) for a more comprehensive review of the previous literature.
Star ratings and number of reviews are the two of main review elements that we
consider. Prior literature has shown that the two measures affect product sales and
consumers’ buying intention. Park and Kim (2009) showed using an experiment that
the number of reviews significantly impacts purchase intention, especially when consumers are not familiar with the product. Similarly, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006)
used online book reviews on Amazon and Barnes and Noble to show that the differences in sales ranks of books between the two websites are due to the differences in
review volumes and prices. Luca (2011) used data from yelp.com to demonstrate that
the increase in star ratings can increase restaurant revenues. Moe and Trusov (2011)
showed that previous ratings affect a reviewer’s judgment and, therefore, have an indirect impact on future product sales. Moreover, Chintagunta et al. (2010) leveraged
online reviews and movie box office performance data to show that the average star
rating also affects product sales.
Simply considering star ratings may not be sufficient according to the prior literature. Pavlou and Dimoka (2006) found on eBay that extreme seller feedback has
a significant effect on seller credibility. In contrast, Eisend (2006) argued that moderate reviews enhance product credibility and brand favorability by providing both
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pros and cons of the product. Mudambi and Schuff (2010) reconciled these contradicting results by explaining that the effect of extreme reviews is moderated by the
product type to which the reviews belong. They also showed that review length is
another important review element and so, we consider that review element as well.
The review length has also been found to be important in Pan and Zhang (2011).
Recent research has further investigated this issue by focusing on textual features
of the reviews. Schlosser (2011) used content analysis and experiments to evaluate
the effect of adding a pros and cons section on the helpfulness and persuasiveness
of reviews. Archak et al. (2011) used text mining to include review text in their
consumer choice model. They showed that textual data can be used to infer consumer
preferences and to forecast sales. In light of these results, we also will consider the
textual content for our analysis.
Next, we review the literature that focuses on understanding how and why people
write reviews. It helps us further our understanding of the impact of monetary
incentives on online reviews.

2.2.2

Review Generation Process

In this subsection, we discuss two substreams related to the study of the review
generation process. The first one relates to review characteristics and the bias in
online review platforms. Marlin et al. (2007) conducted a user study in the context
of online movie ratings and concluded that user preferences affect their choice of
whether to rate or not. Additionally, Marlin and Zemel (2009) showed that the
ratings generated in such circumstances violated the missing-at-random assumption.
Similarly, Hu et al. (2006) conducted an experiment in the context of online reviews
and proposed the “brag-and-moan” model, in which they argued that users with
extreme preferences are more likely to write reviews. This self-selection bias has been
shown to be helpful for retailers by Li and Hitt (2008). They also observed that
the valence of ratings has a downward trend and attributed this to the fact that
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earlier buyers may have significantly different preferences from later buyers. As later
buyers read reviews from earlier buyers who do not share the same taste, the level
of dissatisfaction increases over time. Godes and Silva (2006) also focused on the
downward trending valence but offered a different explanation. They argued that
the total number of reviews increases over time, so the later buyers arrives, the more
reviews they face and the more their ability to thoroughly assess all reviews decreases.
Therefore, later buyers are more likely to make an erroneous purchase, be dissatisfied,
and end up writing negative reviews. Lee et al. (2015) studied the effect of social
interactions on review generation and provided empirical evidence for imitation in
sequentially generated online movie ratings. Gao et al. (2015) were among the first
to study the relationship between online ratings and the opinion of the population,
including offline consumers. In the health care context, they found that lower quality
physicians are less likely to be rated online and although online ratings are correlated
with population opinions, they are usually exaggerated.
The second substream analyzes reviewer motivations. Dellarocas et al. (2006)
showed the similarities of a population’s propensity to engage in offline and online
word-of-mouth. Hennig-Thurau et al. (2004) surveyed participants on a German
web-based customer opinion platform and found that the main factors motivating
reviewers are the desire for social interaction and economic incentives, the concern for
other consumers, and the opportunity to reach self-actualization. Goes et al. (2014)
used data from epionions.com to study empirically how reviewers’ social network
structure impacts reviewing behavior. They showed that popular reviewers tend to
write more and their reviews tend to be more positive. On the other hand, Cheema
and Kaikati (2010) argued that reviewers are less likely to write positive reviews
because they are driven by incentives such as the “need for uniqueness.” Dellarocas
et al. (2010) showed that users are more likely to post reviews for niche products.
Meanwhile, Shen et al. (2015) demonstrated that reviewers behaved strategically in
order to gain attention and that, as a result, the platform ends up with a diverse
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set of reviews. This competition was also observed in the context of user-generated
content in the enterprise IT (Huang et al., 2015).
Given that both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards can play an important role in the
review generation process, we next examine prior works that study the impact of
monetary incentives in related contexts.

2.2.3

The Impact of Monetary Incentives

For decades, the use of monetary incentives in general has been controversial.
Kohn (1999) provides an excellent survey of prior studies that examined the impact
of monetary incentives in areas such as psychology and economics. Studies in IS
literature have also investigated the effect of monetary incentives in different contexts,
and the empirical results are mixed. For example, in the crowdsourcing context, Liu
et al. (2014) found that quality of the tasks performed is higher when the incentives
are higher in the Taskcn platform. However, Hsieh et al. (2010) and Chen et al.
(2010) used data from Google Answers to conclude otherwise. They found that
financial incentives lead to higher volume and longer answers but that the incentives
merely affect the quality of the answers. These contradictory results regarding the
impact of monetary incentives on task quality also extend to the context of online
reviews. Stephen et al. (2012) conducted a laboratory experiment to study the impact
of monetary incentives on reviewer behavior. They found that reviewers who are paid
to write are likely to produce more useful content. On the other hand, Wang et al.
(2012) performed a laboratory experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk and found no
significant difference in the quality of paid and unpaid reviews. Note that it is hard
to capture intrinsic motivation in a laboratory setting, which is a key factor driving
behavior in review platforms. Therefore, one has to be careful when extrapolating
results from lab experiments. As we will discuss later, our results from a naturally
occurring experiment appear to be significantly different from their findings.
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In sum, although previous literature has identified critical aspects and elements
of online reviews that affect consumer behavior and has studied how these elements
are generated, an unexplained gap still exists at the intersection of online reviews
and monetary incentives. This gap is particularly important as the practice of using
monetary incentives to attract reviewers has become common among businesses. Yet,
there is virtually no empirical evidence to show the implications of such a practice in
the specific context of online reviews. Meanwhile, previous studies in related contexts
such as crowdsourcing show conflicting findings and may not apply to review platforms
because of the structural differences between the environments. Our study aims to
fill this gap by examining how monetary incentives affect the review components
that have been shown to be of consequence to consumer behavior, the impact of
such incentives on intrinsically motivated reviewers, and the implications of using
monetary incentives for the review platform. To the best of our knowledge, our work
is the first to empirically investigate the impact of economic incentives, particularly
monetary rewards, on an online review platform.

2.3

Hypothesis Development
In this section, we develop our research hypotheses related to the impact of mon-

etary incentives on online reviews and the review platform. Since previous literature
that studied online reviews primarily examines the reviews at two levels, contentlevel (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Luca, 2011) and platform-level (e.g., Hu
et al., 2009), we also separate our hypotheses development and analyses into those
two levels. Our content-level hypotheses examine how monetary incentives affect the
review-level elements and characteristics. Meanwhile, the platform-level hypotheses
and analyses investigate the effect of monetary incentives on the aggregated platformlevel parameters.
Before developing our research hypotheses, we wish to highlight a few specific
relevant details regarding our empirical study. First, the retailer which is the platform
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owner provides the monetary incentives on the review platform. Note that the owner
of the review platform does not directly manufacture any of the products. Hence,
it generally does not favor one product over another, and arguably the platform’s
main objective is to provide meaningful, impartial, high-quality, and useful reviews
to consumers. Second, online review platforms typically tend to impose restrictions
on reviews posted, for example, a minimum number of words to ensure the reviews are
meaningful. Similar restrictions are imposed in several online review platforms such as
Best Buy, Kmart, and Rakuten. Our analysis evaluates the changes in review elements
and characteristics in response to the monetary incentive program conditional on
all such requirements remaining the same. Third, monetary rewards offered by the
platform are solely based on the number of reviews contributed by reviewers as long
as those reviews meet the requirements (in this case, they have to be at least 50
characters long). The example platforms mentioned earlier also follow this policy.

2.3.1

Content-Level Hypotheses

We first study the effect of monetary incentives on review-level elements and
characteristics. Since the the total number of reviews can obviously and intuitively
be expected to increase because of monetary incentives, we are primarily interested
in how monetary incentives affect review quality and review valence.

Review Quality
Review quality typically represents the effort exerted by the reviewers, since better quality reviews require more time and effort. Writing reviews without receiving
monetary rewards is similar to contributing to a public good (Bolton et al., 2004;
Chen et al., 2010) and contributions to a public good are largely driven by intrinsic
motivation (Li et al., 2012). We develop our hypotheses regarding the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations using two related conceptual backgrounds,
rationality and reciprocity.
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Recall that monetary rewards from the platform are based on the number of reviews posted, and not on the quality of the reviews. Hence, once the minimum length
requirement to get the reward is met, the marginal financial payoff of exerting additional effort and writing additional details goes to zero. If new reviewers are mainly
rational utility maximizers driven by extrinsic rewards, they exert minimal effort and
write short reviews just to satisfy the requirements. Among existing reviewers, extrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation and result in lower quality reviews.
This unintended impact of monetary incentives has been extensively researched by
psychologists and behavioral economists in contexts such as labor productivity and
creativity (e.g., Kohn, 1999). If this effect of monetary rewards is dominant, new
and existing reviewers end up exerting less effort and writing shorter reviews. We
will revisit the impact of the treatment on existing reviewer behavior later in section
2.3.2, where we motivate our platform-level hypotheses. In summary, if reviewers
focus more on this rational aspect of the decision, extrinsic motivation will be the
main driver, and as a result, the average review quality will decrease.
It is also possible that recipients of monetary rewards might develop a sense of
gratitude to the platform (Wood et al., 2011). The reward could invoke a strong
sense of direct reciprocity (May, 1987) and encourage reviewers to spend more effort
in writing reviews (i.e., write reviews with better quality) to show their appreciation.
A number of existing studies have found a positive relationship between monetary
incentives and contribution quality. For instance, Stephen et al. (2012) concluded in
their laboratory experiment study that reviewers who are paid to write reviews tend
to write higher quality reviews.
Based on the above discussion, the impact of monetary rewards on review quality
is not obvious. Therefore, we motivate this hypothesis as an open empirical question:
Hypothesis 1a Review quality decreases after monetary incentives.
Hypothesis 1b Review quality increases after monetary incentives.
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We use four different measures to evaluate changes in review quality. Our first
measure is review length (i.e., word count). Prior literature has shown that word count
outperforms more complex methods in evaluating the quality of Wikipedia articles
(Blumenstock, 2008). Furthermore, in the specific context of online reviews, Mudambi
and Schuff (2010) found a positive connection between length and helpfulness score
of the reviews. Our second measure of review quality is the helpfulness score which is
given by other users. The helpfulness score is widely used in the previous literature to
measure review quality (e.g., Ghose and Ipeirotis, 2006; Chen et al., 2008). In addition
to these two numerical measures, we also study the changes in textual features of
reviews. We first use readability analysis as an alternative method of measuring
review quality. The readability index has been shown to be a reliable indicator of
online review quality (e.g., Korfiatis et al., 2008; Li et al., 2016). Lastly, we also study
the change in the information content of review text. Specifically, we measure the
change in frequency of feature-related discussions in reviews posted before and after
monetary incentives.

Review Valence
Review valence captures the reviewer’s experience with the product. Generally,
review platforms aim to capture the reviewers’ direct experience with the products
(how the reviewer liked the product and not necessarily issues related to shipping,
etc.). However, external environmental factors are also likely to affect the experience.
In that regard, we hypothesize that indirect reciprocity is likely to play a significant
role in affecting review valence. This indirect reciprocity is simply a mechanism where
a subject who experiences gratitude is motivated to be more generous toward people
or parties other than the giver (Nowak and Roch, 2007). Such “pay-it-forward” behavior is observed in prior experimental and empirical studies. For example, Greiner
and Levati (2005) found that indirect reciprocity helps enable mutual cooperation
in social interactions. Also, Baker and Bulkley (2014) found that the more help a
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member in an organization receives, the more likely that member is to help others. As
a consequence, reviewers that receive monetary incentives from the review platform
are expected to act more generously toward the products for which they are writing
reviews. Another potential influencing factor here is direct reciprocity, i.e., the gratitude the reviewers feel toward the platform for the reward (May, 1987). However,
the effect of direct reciprocity is not clear, since how the reviewers reciprocate is not
obvious. If reviewers believe that higher ratings and more positive reviews help the
platform, the effect of direct reciprocity is similar to that of indirect reciprocity. However, if direct reciprocity drives reviewers to put in more time and effort and write
more honest reviews, we likely will not observe meaningful changes in valence, and
such an effect is hard to test statistically.
Hypothesis 2 Review valence becomes more positive after monetary incentives.
We measure valence using two different variables that are widely used in the
literature. Following Chintagunta et al. (2010), our first measure is the star rating
associated with online reviews. As highlighted in Section 2.2.1, star ratings capture a
quantified summary of review details and customer experience within one dimension
(a number between 1 and 5). In addition to the star ratings, we also examine the
textual content of the reviews and use sentiment analysis to investigate change in the
sentiment of the reviews.

2.3.2

Platform-Level Hypotheses

In this subsection, we examine how the introduction of monetary incentives affects
the review platform, specifically, how it affects existing reviewer behavior, the number
of new reviewers, and the bias in selecting the product to review.
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Behavior of Existing Reviewers
Existing reviewers are users who contributed reviews to the platform even before
the introduction of incentives, driven solely by intrinsic motivation. As such, they
are a critical part of the review platform’s user base, and changes in the behavior of
these reviewers as a result of the incentives are important from the standpoint of the
platform and should be studied. As we discussed when developing Hypotheses H1a
and H1b, writing online reviews is akin to contributing to a public good and contributions to a public good tend to be driven by intrinsic motivation. Monetary incentives
could create unintended negative effects when interacting with intrinsic motivation
(e.g., Kohn, 1999; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Mellström and Johannesson (2008)
empirically found that monetary rewards could actually undermine the contribution
level of volunteers in the context of blood donation. This effect is called the “motivation crowding-out effect” which is a phenomenon where extrinsic rewards negatively
affect intrinsic motivation (Kreps, 1997). It is especially relevant in contexts where
intrinsic motivation is the primary driver of behavior (Gneezy et al., 2011). For the
same reason, in the context of the review platform, we hypothesize that monetary
incentives will have a negative effect on existing reviewer participation. Formally,
Hypothesis 3 Existing reviewers reduce their effort level after monetary incentives.
We investigate the change in existing reviewers’ effort by measuring the change in
their level and quality of participation. We use the number of reviews written as a
proxy for participation level and the length and helpfulness score of the reviews as
proxies for review quality.

Number of New Reviewers
The next interesting question is whether the monetary incentives could persuade
new reviewers to join and contribute. Note that users are heterogeneous in their
contribution costs and how they derive utility from contributing. It is reasonable
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to assume that users who were not contributing reviews before monetary incentives
have lower levels of intrinsic motivation compared with existing reviewers. Some of
these users have sufficiently low entry costs that they could be encouraged to start
contributing by the monetary incentives. On the other hand, the crowding-out effect
(Titmuss, 1970) could reduce the number of new reviewers, since the introduction of
rewards could negatively impact their intrinsic motivation. However, since intrinsic
motivation in these users is on average weaker, we hypothesize that the overall impact
of the monetary incentives on attracting new reviewers is positive. Therefore:
Hypothesis 4 The total number of new reviewers increases after monetary incentives.

Bias in Selecting Products to Review
Hu et al. (2009) note that biases in review platforms may be due to purchasing
(more positively reviewed products are purchased more often and therefore have a
higher chance of receiving reviews) or under-reporting (reviewers find the “entry cost”
for writing reviews too high and so do not write reviews unless they are extremely
negative or positive about their experience). As mentioned in the literature review, we
are mainly focused on how review generation is affected as a consequence of monetary
incentives. Understanding bias is important for practitioners, because they can invest
in practices to alleviate such biases.
We hypothesize that after the introduction of monetary rewards, reviewers are
more likely to choose highly rated products to review for the following reasons. First,
as we argued in the development of Hypothesis 2, indirect reciprocity likely induces
reviewers to write more positive reviews. The theory of information cascade claims
that users who choose not to conform to the majority assessment are more likely to
suffer from cognitive stress (Kuran and Sunstein, 1999). Therefore, to reduce that
cognitive stress, reviewers choose to review products that are already highly rated.
Second, relatedly, cognitive stress increases when more people express their opinion
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(Lee et al., 2015). Since monetary incentives increase the review volume, we expect
the conformity effect to also be stronger. Third, the previous literature has shown
that less experienced reviewers tend to follow the crowd more so than experienced
ones (Moe and Schweidel, 2012). Since we expect an increase in the number of new
reviewers as discussed earlier, overall, we expect that reviewers will conform more
with the crowd.
Hypothesis 5 Reviews are concentrated more toward highly rated products after
monetary incentives.

2.4

Research Context and Data
In order to test the research hypotheses, we collected data from two online re-

tailers. In this section, we provide information about the study context and present
details on the platforms we study.

2.4.1

The Treated Platform

Our main platform of interest is a large American retailer with billions of dollars
in annual revenues with both brick-and-mortar and online operations. Although it
has subsidiaries that operate in other North American countries, we gathered our
data from one of its e-commerce websites which primarily serves customers in the
United States. On April 13, this platform introduced a monetary reward program
to incentivize reviewers (no extrinsic rewards were offered by the platform prior to
April 2013). According to the incentive program, reviewers receive 25 loyalty points
for every review they submit. Reviews have to be at least 50 characters long, a
requirement that also existed before the introduction of the incentive program. A
reviewer can be rewarded for up to eight reviews per year, earning a maximum of
200 loyalty points. Note that no restrictions are placed on the number of personas a
reviewer can use for writing reviews. Also, reviewers are allowed to review products
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that they did not purchase on the platform. The points earned can be exchanged
for certificates that can be used toward in-store or online purchases of products and
services (certificates could not be used to buy gift cards). The exchange rate is
250 points for a $5 certificate with additional certificates issued only in 250 point
increments2 . The certificates, including those issued to other personas, could be
combined when purchasing products before August 2013. Afterward, only multiple
certificates issued to the same persona can be combined. This incentive structure
(issuing rewards based on level of participation) was a common practice among review
platforms in 2013. For example, Rakuten offered 100 points (valued at $1) for each
review posted by a verified purchaser. Another example is Kmart which offered 500
points (valued at $0.50) for every review that met their minimum length requirement.
The decision of the treated platform to introduce a new incentive mechanism which
was previously nonexistent provides us with an ideal setting for a natural experiment
design.
As regards the product type, we chose the video game category for the following
reasons. First, video games are very good examples of experience goods which fit our
research interest. Features of search goods can easily be observed before purchase. On
the other hand, it is hard to evaluate the features of experience goods before purchase
(Nelson, 1970; Tirole, 1988). So reviews of experience goods are generally more important and impactful. Second, the life cycle of video games is reasonably long, so we
can observe reviews of video games of different qualities without significant censoring
issues. This is not the case for some other products such as laptops. Laptops have
short life cycles, and reviews of obsolete models are not available. Third, practically
all video games have a unique identifier that can be used to quickly identify them
across different platforms. Fourth, many empirical papers have studied video games
as their product category of choice (e.g., Zhu and Zhang, 2010; Nair, 2007).
2

At the time the incentive program was introduced, there were avenues other than posting reviews
to earn loyalty points. For example, users could visit any of the treated platform’s physical stores
in the U.S. and check in using its smartphone app to receive 10 points. In addition, users could
participate in the platform’s social polls, which were a part of its Facebook application, and receive
10 points for each answer.
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We started collecting data in August 2013. We began by acquiring a list of available products in the video games category on the treated platform. For each product,
we then collected product details and all the information about the product reviews.
As we will explain later in 2.4.2, we also collected reviews from a control platform
for the corresponding products. We eliminated products that were invalid (such as
products wrongly classified as video games) and those listed multiple times (e.g.,
digital download and pre-owned versions of the same product). We also discarded
anonymous reviews (which accounted for only around 1.3% of the original sample).
In the end, we had 6,316 reviews written by 5,242 users for 963 products. Note that
out of those 963 proucts, 804 of them were released before the beginning of the time
window of our study (January 1, 2013) to which, 4,035 of the reviews belong.

2.4.2

The Control Platform

We collected data on the same set of products from another review platform
to serve as the control group for our analysis. We examined several e-commerce
websites as candidates, including both click-only retailers (such as Amazon.com and
Newegg.com.com) and click-and-mortar retailers (such as Walmart.com). The most
important requirement was for the platform not to offer any direct monetary rewards
for writing reviews over the time frame of our study. We found that Amazon.com
not only had the largest set of products, but also the largest number of reviews. In
addition, Amazon.com reviews are widely used by customers as a reputable source
of information, and many previous papers have used review data from Amazon to
study various problems related to online reviews and electronic word-of-mouth (e.g.,
Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Shen et al., 2015).
Furthermore, Amazon’s review platform is quite stable and consistent, making
it an ideal candidate as a control group. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of star
ratings of reviews on Amazon.com for reviews posted between January and March
2013 (the first time frame of our analysis), and between May and July 2013 (the
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second time frame of our analysis). The distributions look almost identical. We
also performed the chi-square goodness of fit test to compare the two distributions.
The p-value for the test was 0.12, so we found no statistically meaningful difference
between pre-treatment and post-treatment distributions.

Figure 2.1.: The distribution of star ratings of reviews on Amazon.com in two timeframes

We collected review data from Amazon.com for the time period of our study,
January to July 2013. In total, 37,672 reviews from 28,342 reviewers were collected
for the same 963 products as the ones on the treated platform. 26,823 of these reviews
were written for the 804 products that were released before January 1, 2013. The
summary statistics of the review elements and characteristics are presented in Table
2.1. The statistics are calculated separately for the treated platform and control
platform, and for both time periods. “Before” corresponds to the time period before
monetary incentives, while “After” corresponds to the time period afterward.

2.5

Empirical Analysis and Results
In this section, we discuss our empirical models, present the results of our analyses,

and discuss our findings. We organize our analyses and present the findings based on
the modeling approaches we use. Therefore, the sequence of models will not exactly
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Table 2.1.: Summary statistics of review elements (cross-sectional, per product)
Treated Platform
Before

Control Platform

After

Before

After

Mean

S.D. Mean

S.D. Mean

S.D. Mean

S.D

Total number of reviews

1.4

5.0

3.6

8.5

21.5

4.2

11.9

18.7

Average title length (in words)

4.5

1.8

4.0

1.4

3.5

1.2

3.7

1.9

Average content length (in words) 51.3

57.2

33.2

17.4

61.6

56.1

67.2

55.8

Average star ratings

0.8

4.3

0.7

4.2

0.7

4.2

0.8

4.3

follow that of the hypothesis development section. At the end of this section, we
present a table summarizing our findings regarding the research hypotheses.

2.5.1

Content-Level Analyses

We start our analysis at the content level where we empirically examine the impact of monetary incentives on review elements and characteristics. Specifically, we
investigate the impact of monetary incentives on star rating, length, helpfulness, and
textual content of the reviews.

Review Length and Star Ratings
For this analysis, we set up our data as a panel dataset such that each observation
corresponds to a review. As discussed earlier, the monetary incentive program was
introduced in the middle of April 2013. Hence, to study the impact of the treatment,
we compare different measures of interest on the treated platform against the control
platform before and after the treatment. To ensure we are not measuring only the
immediate treatment effects, we drop the data for April 2013 and compare 3 months
before and after the month of treatment (April). As a result, our dataset covers
reviews from January 1 to March 31, 2013 (before treatment) and May 1 to July 31,
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2013 (after treatment). The unit of time is defined to be semi-monthly, so we have a
total of 12 time periods, 6 periods before and 6 after the treatment. For product set,
we first conduct our analysis on reviews of products released before the beginning of
the time window of our study to ensure that all reviews are displayed on the review
platform in the pre-treatment period for as long as they are displayed in the posttreatment period (i.e., the panel is balanced). In total, there are 2,916 reviews of 804
products on the treated platform that meet this criterion. As a robustness test, we
later included all 963 products in the dataset and found that the results are consistent.
Drawing inferences about the effect of an exogenous event solely based on the
analysis of data from the treated platform could be prone to identification issues. It is
possible that product characteristics could impact review elements. For example, the
release of an update for some video games after treatment could affect user experience
and result in changes in reviews. If we only use data from the treated platform, we
might mistakenly attribute such factors to the treatment. Therefore as discussed in
Section 2.4.2, we leverage data from another review platform as the control group
during the same time period, and use the difference-in-differences approach as our
identification strategy. The difference-in-differences technique has been widely used in
IS literature to account for potential identification issues similar to those we described
earlier (e.g., Hosanagar et al., 2013; Chan and Ghose, 2014).
To control for product-level characteristics, we matched products across two platforms using a 2-stage matching practice. First, we used an automated script to match
products based on their names and gaming platforms. Only products that have exactly the same name and platform are matched at this stage. Then as a second step,
we performed a manual screening to match the rest of the products. So we are able
to include product, time and platform fixed effects in our difference-in-differences regression framework. The analysis is performed at the review-level with the following
model specification:
DVitp = αi + δt + ζp + βXitp + γMtp + itp ,

(2.1)
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In equation 2.1, DVitp is the dependent variable of interest, αi captures productlevel fixed effects, δt captures time fixed effects, and ζp captures platform-level fixed
effects. Mtp is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the review is written
on the treated platform in the post-treatment period (after the introduction of the
monetary incentives) and 0 otherwise, and Xitp is a set of control variables.
Table 2.2.: Results from the regression analysis using the difference-in-differences
approach
Title Word Count

Content Word Count

Star Ratings

-0.466*** (0.109)

-10.051*** (3.280)

0.128** (0.056)

Number of new products -0.002 (0.004)

0.167 (0.199)

-0.004*** (0.002)

Alexa rank

-0.003 (0.004)

0.029 (0.118)

0.003* (0.002)

Constant

3.656*** (0.061)

71.102*** (3.025)

4.430*** (0.028)

Product fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Platform fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

26,548

26,548

26,548

Mtp

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by product.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01.

The results of three difference-in-differences models for title word count, content
word count, and star ratings are presented in Table 2.2. Star rating is used to measure
review valence, while title and content review word count are proxies for review
quality. The number of new products represents the number of new video games
released on the relevant platform in a given time period. The release of new products
might affect how much attention, time, and effort users dedicate to writing reviews for
existing products. Alexa rank is the global website rank provided by Alexa.com for the
relevant platform at the end of each time period. This time-varying control captures
potential shocks to the popularity of platforms that might affect user involvement.
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Other potential confounding factors which are unchanging at the levels of platforms,
products, or time are captured by the fixed effects.
The findings suggest that monetary incentives resulted in a significant decrease
in the word count of the title and review content, which supports Hypothesis 1a.
Monetary incentives appear to have a significant influence on the rational side of
reviewers on average for an effort-intensive task like writing reviews. Hence, reviewers
spend less effort and write shorter reviews, since additional effort beyond the required
minimal level does not earn them additional rewards. In addition, the incentive
program significantly increases the star ratings of reviews. This finding supports
Hypothesis 2 and provides evidence that the effect of indirect reciprocity (Nowak and
Roch, 2007) is prominent in our context. As reviewers receive monetary incentives
from the platform, they act more generously toward products they review and issue
higher ratings. Also, it appears that, on average, the impact of direct reciprocity does
not contradict the indirect reciprocity effect. In other words, reviewers who wish
to show their gratitude to the review platform also seem to be doing so by giving
higher star ratings. To ensure robustness, we consider alternative specifications such
as including reviews of all 963 products and defining alternative time periods such
as February to June 2013 (including and excluding April). Results from all these
alternative specifications are qualitatively similar.

Review Helpfulness Score
In 2.5.1, we studied review length as a proxy for review quality. Here, we examine
the change in the helpfulness score of the reviews to further investigate the effect
of monetary incentives on review quality. For every review posted on the treated
platform, a question exists at the bottom of the review asking if the review is helpful.
The helpfulness score is a non-negative number showing the total number of helpful
votes the review has received. No additional information (such as the history or trend
of the score) is provided. Note that reviews written when the writer was exposed to
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monetary incentives are by definition more recent than the ones written before the
treatment. Furthermore, ceteris paribus, older reviews (i.e., reviews that are posted
earlier) are likely to have higher review helpfulness scores compared with more recent
ones because they have had more time to get helpfulness votes. As a result, although
the original data used for the main analysis has helpfulness scores, we are unable to
directly attribute the change in the helpfulness score to the introduction of monetary
incentives using the main dataset.
To overcome this issue, we re-collected review helpfulness scores for the reviews
in our dataset in February 2015. Some products were no longer available in February
2015 on the treated platform, so we discarded the reviews of those products. After
removing those observations, we had 2,151 reviews from 272 products. For each
review, we determined the change in the review helpfulness score between August
2013 and January 2015. This measure is directly comparable across all reviews in our
dataset, regardless of when they were written. Unlike our analysis on review length
and star rating, review helpfulness is unlikely to be affected by confounding timevarying factors. For example, an external shock that could change the helpfulness of
a particular review over time is unlikely. Therefore, we are in a position to use the
following specification to analyze the impact of monetary incentives on the change in
the review helpfulness score for review j for product i:
ChangeInHelpf ulnessScoreij = αi + βReviewAgeij + γMij + ij ,

(2.2)

where αi captures product fixed effects and ReviewAgeij is the age of review j in
months on July 31, 2013. Although our dependent variable measures the change in
helpfulness during a fixed period of time, some of the differences between reviews
might still be due to differences in when they were written. ReviewAgeij controls for
such potential residual differences. Mij is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
review j is posted after the introduction of monetary incentives and 0 otherwise.
Table 2.3 reports the results from the analysis. The increase in review helpfulness
score is significantly lower for reviews posted after monetary incentives compared with
reviews posted before. The size of the difference is relative large, since the increase
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Table 2.3.: Changes in review helpfulness score
Change in Helpfulness Score
Mij

-0.173*** (0.051)

Review Age

-0.049*** (0.012)

Constant

0.319*** (0.085)

Product Fixed Effects
N

Yes
2,151

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by product.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01.

in review helpfulness score is generally small (0.16 on average). This result indicates
that reviews posted after monetary incentives are not only shorter (as we reported in
2.5.1) but also less helpful in the eyes of customers, which further supports Hypothesis
1a. This is consistent with the finding in previous literature that review length and
review helpfulness scores tend to be correlated for experience goods (Mudambi and
Schuff, 2010). It is also worth noting that the estimated relationship between review
age and changes in review helpfulness score is negative, indicating that older reviews
are less likely to receive additional helpfulness votes. This behavior is consistent with
the treated platform’s review system that sorts reviews by age from newest to oldest
in ascending order by default.
As a robustness check, we also considered including reviews of products that were
released after the start of our period of analysis. After including them, the dataset
consists of 3,340 reviews from 339 products. In addition, we also varied the length
of the time period, including two months before/after monetary incentives (with and
without April 2013). The results are qualitatively similar.
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Textual Feature Analysis
So far, we have focused on the changes in quantitative review measurements such
as star rating, helpfulness score, and word count. However, the value of online reviews is not limited only to such quantitative measurements. Previous literature has
established that textual features of online reviews are also important, and contain
information in addition to quantitative measures (e.g., Pavlou and Dimoka, 2006;
Archak et al., 2011). Hence, in this section, we investigate our research hypotheses
by analyzing review contents using several textual analysis techniques. These analyses help us learn about the content of reviews and investigate the robustness of our
earlier findings. Particularly, we conducted sentiment analysis to investigate changes
in review valence, a readability analysis to provide an alternative measurement of the
changes in review quality, and topic modeling to analyze the differences in review
content between the two time frames. Note that the analyses in this section were
conducted on the reviews from the same dataset used in our main analyses in Section
2.5.1.
Readability Analysis and Sentiment Analysis
We start our analysis of textual content by calculating the Gunning-Fog index (Gunning, 1969) to measure the readability of reviews and examine the changes in the value
of the index before and after monetary incentives. The Gunning-Fog index estimates
the years of education readers need to understand the text, the first time they read it.
The GF index has been widely used in the IS literature to calculate readability scores,
especially for online reviews (e.g., Goes et al., 2014; Yin et al., 2016). In addition,
previous literature has established that higher GF index values (i.e., more complex
text) are usually associated with higher review quality as perceived by consumers
(e.g., Korfiatis et al., 2008; Li et al., 2016). The formula used to calculate the index
is as follows and “complex words” are defined as words with three or more syllables.


Number of Words
Gunning-Fog Index = 0.4 ×
+
Number of Sentences



Number of complex words
× 100
Number of Words


. (2.3)
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We then measured the sentiments of reviews posted before and after monetary
incentives and across the treated and control platforms. We examined both positive
and negative sentiments of review content as they reflect the objectivity of reviews (Lu
et al., 2013). We used the Harvard General Inquirer3 to perform sentiment analysis.
The Harvard General Inquirer is a lexicon-based content analysis tool which is widely
used to extract the tone and sentiment of textual content such as financial reports
(e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2011), news stories (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2008), and
review text (e.g., Shen et al., 2015). We adopted an approach similar to that used by
Shen et al. (2015) to analyze the sentiment of review text by using the frequency of
positive and negative words in each review to measure the sentiment of that review.
After calculating the Gunning-Fog index, the percentage of positive words and
the percentage of negative words for each review, we then performed the differencein-differences test using a regression framework with the same specification presented
in equation 2.1. Results are reported in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4.: Results from the textual feature analysis
Percentage of

Percentage of

Positive Words

Negative Words

0.422* (0.253)

-0.418*** (0.141)

Number of new products 0.016*** (0.005)

-0.020** (0.008)

0.007 (0.004)

Alexa rank

0.001 (0.005)

0.002 (0.010)

0.004 (0.006)

Constant

7.677*** (0.081)

8.699*** (0.149)

2.355*** (0.081)

Product fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Platform fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

26,548

26,548

26,548

Gunning-Fog Index
Mtp

-0.464*** (0.135)

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by product.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01.
3

The information regarding the tool is available at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/ inquirer/.
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Regression estimates imply that the Gunning-Fog index significantly decreased
after the monetary incentive program was introduced. In other words, the reviews
posted after the treatment were on average less complicated than those posted before.
Our results from 2.5.1 and 2.5.1 indicated that reviews posted after monetary incentives are of lower quality (shorter and less helpful), and the results from the analysis of
changes in the GF index further corroborate those findings. Our results are therefore
consistent with the previous literature that studies the connection between readability score and review quality (e.g., Korfiatis et al., 2008; Li et al., 2016). Therefore,
Hypothesis 1a is further supported, while we did not find evidence to support H1b.
Results from the sentiment analysis in the third and fourth columns in Table 2.4
indicate that monetary incentives increase positive review sentiment (although the
statistical power is weak), and significantly reduce negative sentiment. These results
further validate our earlier findings in 2.5.1 that monetary incentives induce reviewers
to be more generous toward the products and hence reviews are more positive. This
provides further support for Hypothesis 2, implying that indirect reciprocity is a
strong factor in the presence of monetary incentives in this context.
Topic Modeling
Analyzing the sentiment and readability of review text, we found that users are writing
simpler and more positive reviews after the introduction of monetary incentives. In
this section, we proceed further and study whether the information content of review
text changes post treatment. To do so, we take advantage of the topic modeling
approach. Topic modeling is an unsupervised learning algorithm for discovering the
main themes of unstructured documents and generating a predefined number of topics
(Blei, 2012). Topics are estimated as latent constructs and number of topics must be
fixed before estimation. It has been recently used by IS researchers to identify topics
from textual content (e.g., Singh et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2015).
We used the topicmodels package in R (Grün and Hornik, 2011) to analyze review
text on both treated and control platforms pre and post-treatment. The package uses

32
Gibbs sampling to estimate the distribution of terms over topics and the distribution
of topics over reviews given an a-priori fixed number of topics. We ran the model given
2, 3, 4 and 5 topics, and inspected the distribution of terms. We found that the choice
of 2 topics provided the most meaningfully and intuitively separated distribution.4
In the first identified topic, terms ”great”, ”love”, ”fun”, ”good” and ”enjoy” are
the top five terms. So this topic likely represents the quality of the game and user
experience. The top five terms for the second topic are ”make”, ”character”, ”story”,
”player” and ”level”. So the second topic is clearly related to the features of the
video games. In other words, the second topic includes likely useful information,
while the first topic relays information akin to that summarized in the star rating.
For the number of topics greater than 2, the topics are not easy to distinguish, define
and label (i.e., other topics appear to be essentially a combination of the first two
topics.) In addition, we also used four goodness of fit metrics to ensure the validity
of our choice. The metrics proposed by Cao et al. (2009) and Deveaud et al. (2014)
suggest that the optimal number of topics is 2. The metrics proposed by Griffiths and
Steyvers (2004) and Arun et al. (2010), on the other hand, suggest that the optimal
number is much larger. Given the intuitively meaningful distribution of words we
achieve by choosing 2 topics, and the conflicting suggestions from these two other
metrics, we proceeded with the choice of 2 topics.
We are interested in the impact of monetary incentive on the informativeness
of reviews, or how much information regarding product features is included in the
reviews. Therefore, we set up a difference-in-differences regression model where the
dependent variable is the probability that a review is related to the second topic (video
game features). The right-hand side variables are similar to those in our main model
in Equation 2.1. The results are presented in Table 2.5. As we see, the treatment
effect Mij is negative and statistically significant. It suggests that the treatment is
associated with a decrease of about 0.8% in the discussion of the second topic in the
reviews, further supporting our Hypothesis 1a.
4

Details of topic modeling estimation and results are available from the authors upon request.
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It appears that after monetary rewards were introduced, users shared more about
their feelings toward the product rather than discussing product features in their
reviews. To test the robustness of our finding, we followed a second approach and
constructed Bayesian credible intervals using the Gibbs draws. The results show that
the decrease in the prevalence of topic 2 (product features) is statistically significant
at p − value < 0.01 (99% credible interval is (0.004, 0.009)).

Table 2.5.: Regression results from the topic modeling analysis
Textual Topic
Mij

-0.008*** (0.003)

Number of new products

0.001 (0.001)

Alexa rank

0.001* (0.001)

Constant

0.494*** (0.002)

Product Fixed Effects

Yes

Platform Fixed Effects

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

N

26,548

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by product.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01.

2.5.2

Platform-Level Analysis

In the previous section, we focused on the direct impact of monetary incentives
on reviews. In this section, we investigate the impact of monetary incentives at the
platform level. Specifically, we are interested in the changes in existing reviewer
behavior due to monetary incentives, how the incentives impact the number of new
reviewers, and the implications of monetary incentives for review diversity on the
platform.
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Existing Reviewer Behavior
In this subsection, we are interested in the change in existing reviewers’ behavior
due to the introduction of monetary incentives. We investigate two review elements:
total number of reviews and the length of the reviews posted by existing reviewers,
as these two elements are directly related to the effort level that reviewers contribute
to the review platform. For the analyses in this subsection, we set up the dataset at
the reviewer level (each observation is a reviewer). Also, to be consistent with our
previous analyses, the period of study covers the six-month period between January
to March 2013 and May to July 2013, and the unit of time is half a month. Note that
we restrict our attention to only active reviewers who wrote at least one review on the
treated platform between January 1, 2013 and March 31, 2013 before the introduction
of the monetary rewards. In total, 1,259 reviews from 1,071 reviewers were included
in the dataset.
In the analysis, the independent variable of interest is a dummy variable Mt which
takes value 1 if monetary incentives are available at time period t and 0 otherwise.
As for control variables, we consider the number of new products released on each
platform in each time period as a time-varying factor. In addition, one might argue
that the decrease in the number of reviews may just reflect a time trend. For example,
people might write reviews less often over time. Therefore, we include a time trend
as another control variable. We represent the vector of control variables as Xkt .
First, we check for serial correlation in our outcome variables (i.e., the number
of reviews, the average title word count of reviews, and the average content word
count of reviews posted by existing reviewers in each time period) using the method
proposed by Wooldridge (2010). We find that none of our dependent variables suffer
from autocorrelation. Therefore, we use a fixed-effects panel data model to estimate
the effect of monetary incentives on the number of reviews, the average title word
count, and the average content word count. Our model specification is as follows:
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DVkt = c + βXkt + γMt + νk + kt .

(2.4)

Table 2.6.: Results of the fixed-effect analysis of existing reviewers behavior
Number of Reviews

Title Word Count Content Word Count

Mt

-0.306*** (0.011)

-1.426 (0.873)

-24.613 (26.917)

Number of new products

-0.011*** (0.001)

0.043* (0.024)

0.885 (0.934)

Time trend

0.008*** (0.001)

0.112 (0.126)

7.907 (5.018)

Constant

0.326*** (0.009)

3.709*** (0.396)

12.977 (23.004)

Yes

Yes

Yes

12,852

1,121

1,121

Reviewer fixed effect
N

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by reviewer.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01.

Table 2.6 reports results from the fixed-effects model. We find that the effect
of monetary incentives on the existing reviewers’ effort is two-fold. First, monetary
incentives reduce the level of participation of existing reviewers, inducing them to
write significantly less often.5 However, once they commit to writing reviews, their
effort is not affected by monetary incentives. Hence, the length of reviews posted after
monetary incentives by existing reviewers is not statistically different from reviews
posted before. In addition, we find that the time trend has a positive effect on the
number of reviews although the magnitude of the effect is small. Therefore, it appears
that existing reviewers on the treated platform tend to write more reviews over time.
Moreover, the number of new products available to the platform has a negative impact
on the number of reviews, suggesting a substitution effect. As a result, an increase in
the number of new products is associated with a small decrease the number of reviews
posted.
5

One may argue that our observation is because existing reviewers may be creating new accounts to
write reviews to obtain more rewards given the restriction of rewards for a maximum of 8 reviews
per year. We evaluated the number of reviews each existing reviewer submitted after the incentive
program, and found that none of the 1,243 existing reviewers reached that limit.
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As we observe that the length of reviews posted by existing reviewers does not
change before and after incentives, we proceed to examine the change in the review
helpfulness score as another measure of review quality. We employ the same specification used in 2.5.1, but restrict our attention to only reviews posted by existing
reviewers. The results show no significant difference in the change of review helpfulness scores for reviews posted by existing reviewers in the presence of monetary
incentives. Hence, it appears that monetary incentives reduce the level of participation of existing reviewers but not the quality of participation.
Table 2.7.: Changes in review helpfulness score for existing reviewers
Change in Helpfulness Score
Mij

0.098 (0.140)

Review Age

-0.006 (0.018)

Constant

3.045*** (0.318)

Product Fixed Effects

Yes

N

764

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by product.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01.

Next, to ensure that our findings are robust, we considered several alternative
specifications. First, we changed the definition of an “existing reviewer” by instead
considering reviewers who write at least once on the treated platform in the eightmonth and twelve-month period before monetary incentives. Second, we changed the
time period from semi-monthly to monthly. We found the results to be qualitatively
similar. In addition, as in our main analysis, we also considered using the differencein-differences approach to cross-validate our findings. However, it is worth noting
that we could directly identify and match products between the platforms using their
names in our analysis of star ratings and review length. Meanwhile, the analysis
here is done at the reviewer-level. As we do not have the personal information of
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users to do a similar matching across the platforms, we instead utilize propensity
score matching. We match users by scores constructed through the standard logit
function based on observable characteristics of the users. Propensity score matching
has been widely used in the literature (e.g., Smith and Telang, 2009; Rishika et al.,
2013). In our case, the observable based on which we matched the users is the number
of reviews before monetary incentives (i.e., a vector of semi-monthly observations of
reviews written) for the analysis of number of reviews and the average title word
count and average content word count of reviews written before monetary incentives
for the analysis of review length. Additional details regarding the propensity score
matching are provided in the Online Appendix. After all users are matched, we use a
specification that is similar to equation 2.1. Note that data from the control platform
consists of 23,057 reviews from 20,886 reviewers. The results, shown in Table 2.8, are
consistent with our results from the fixed-effects model. .
Table 2.8.: Results of the difference-in-differences analysis of existing reviewers behavior
Number of Reviews

Title Word Count Content Word Count

Mtp

-0.069*** (0.007)

-0.348 (0.109)

-25.431 (28.412)

Number of new products

0.004*** (0.001)

0.086 (0.071)

-1.882 (1.472)

Constant

0.026*** (0.009)

4.119*** (1.261)

125.491*** (29.347)

Reviewer fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Platform fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

29,988

2,302

2,302

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by reviewer.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01.
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New Reviewers
Here, we study whether monetary incentives can bring more reviewers to the
treated platform. Therefore, we reconstruct our dataset to be a platform-level time
series dataset with semi-monthly time periods. Each observation is the number of new
reviewers who post their first review on the treated platform in that time period. In
total, we have 3,794 new reviewers who joined the treated platform between January
1 to March 31 and May 1 to July 31, 2013. We analyze the data by leveraging the
Autoregressive-Moving-Average (ARMA) model to study the impact of monetary
incentives on the number of new reviewers. Our ARMA(p,q) model with the order
of the autoregressive part p and the order of the moving average part q takes the
following form:
N ewReviewerst = c + εt +

p
X

ϕi N ewReviewert−i +

q
X

i=1

θi εt−i ,

(2.5)

i=1

Here, N ewReviewerst is the number of new reviewers in each time period. We
use the Akaike information criterion (AIC), and the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) as our model selection criteria, and find that optimal values for p and q are 1
and 2 respectively. Hence, we use ARMA(1,2) as the main model for this analysis.
Table 2.9.: The impact of monetary incentives on the number of new reviewers
ARMA(1,2)
Monetary incentives

277.24*** (54.29)

Constant

173.89*** (39.49)

ar (L1)

-0.70 (0.59)

ma (L2)

-1.00** (0.44)

N

12

Notes. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01.

The result, presented in Table 2.9, indicates that monetary incentives appear to
be significantly effective in terms of attracting new reviewers to join the platform.
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Therefore Hypothesis 4 is supported. To ensure the robustness of the finding, we
considered alternative models such as a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model and
an Autoregressive-Moving-Average model with exogenous inputs (ARMAX) that includes other time-varying factors such as the number of new products available to the
platform in each time period. In addition, we also conducted a difference-in-differences
analysis using the number of reviewers on Amazon as the control platform. We found
that the results from all alternative approaches are qualitatively similar.

Bias in Selecting Product to Write Review
In this section, we are interested in understanding how the bias in the way reviewers select products to review changes. Specifically, we study the implications of
monetary incentives for how reviews are distributed. We first formally demonstrate
that the reviews are written for a less diverse group of products after the treatment.
The second analysis builds on the first test to demonstrate the nature of the bias
using a regression model that shows reviews are written disproportionately more for
products with higher star ratings. Subsequently, toward the end of the subsection,
we also discuss the implications of the bias.
First, we define “ex-ante average star rating” as the average star rating that the
reviewer observes before he/she writes a review. We next calculate the number of reviews written for different levels of ex-ante average star ratings, and then, determine
the cumulative distribution of reviews across the ex-ante average star ratings. Following that, we construct a curve similar to the Lorenz curve, plotting the cumulative
number of reviews written against the sorted ex-ante average star ratings (Gastwirth,
1971). We derive the Gini coefficient by dividing the area between the Lorenz curve
and the 45 degree line by the total area under the 45 degree line. This value ranges
from 0 (the least concentration and the highest diversity) to 1 (the highest concentration and the least diversity). Gini coefficient is widely used to study diversity
(e.g., Brynjolfsson et al., 2011; Hosanagar et al., 2013). In testing Hypothesis 5, we
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evaluate whether there is a statistically significant difference in the Gini coefficient
before and after monetary incentives. To do this, we adopt the permutation test
technique (Good, 2005), which has also been used by Lee and Hosanagar (2014) to
measure the impact of recommender systems on sales diversity. We perform a twosided permutation test with 10,000 iterations to get the p-value with up to 4 decimal
places.

Figure 2.2.: The Lorenz curve of reviews on the treated and control platform posttreatment.

Table 2.10.: The differences in Gini coefficient
Jan-Mar

May-Jul

Differences

Treated Platform 0.6493

0.7566

0.1073** (0.0192)

Control Platform

0.7196

0.0384 (0.3321)

0.6812

Notes. ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01. p-values are reported in parentheses.

Figure 2.2 shows the curves for the two platforms, and the corresponding Gini
coefficients are reported in Table 2.10. The plot on the left in Figure 2.2 is for the
treated platform, while the plot on the right is for the control platform. The solid
lines on both plots represent the Lorenz curve of reviews posted between January and
March 2013 (pre-treatment), while the dashed lines represent the curves for reviews
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posted between May and July of 2013 (post-treatment). Note that the difference
between the Gini coefficients for the control platform is not statistically significant. It
shows that likely no global systematic change was present that could affect the reviews
of the products on the control platform during the treatment period. As products
available in the treated and control platforms are almost identical, we can assume
that the same should be true for the treated platform. Now, note that the difference
between the Gini coefficients for the treated platform is statistically significant. It
implies that, on the treated platform, reviews concentrate more on a few groups
of products after the introduction of monetary incentives. We also calculated the
difference in Gini coefficients derived from reviews posted on the treated platform
between January to March 2012 and May to July 2012, and found that the difference
is not statistically significant. Similar finding is observed for the control platform
in 2012. So the change in the diversity of reviews on the treated platform could be
attributed to the treatment.
We established that review concentration bias significantly increases after monetary incentives. Next we characterize the nature of this bias. Reviews are written
more for products with higher ex-ante star ratings on both treated and control platforms, which is consistent with previous literature (e.g., Hu et al., 2009). So, we
are interested in formally testing whether reviews written after the monetary incentives are even more concentrated toward the highly rated products. To do so,
we use a difference-in-differences regression model to examine the impact of monetary incentives on how the selection process is affected by the ex-ante average star
ratings. Therefore, we can account for potential product, time, and platform-level
confounders. We leveraged the main dataset used in section 2.5.1, which consists of
reviews from treated and control platforms. We constructed the observations at the
product level (i.e., each observation is a product), while the time period remained
semi-monthly. For each observation, we calculated the average star ratings of the
product in the previous time period, as our main explanatory variable is of interest.
Our model specification is as follows:
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N umReviewitp = αi + δt + ζp + βXitp + γ1 ExAnteStaritp + γ2 ExAnteStaritp × Mtp + itp , (2.6)

Here, N umReviewitp is the total number of reviews for product i at time t on platform p, αi captures the product-level fixed effects, δt captures the time fixed effects,
and ζp captures the platform-level fixed effects. Xitp is a vector of control variables.
ExAnteStaritp is the average star ratings for product i on platform p at the previous
time period (t − 1). Mtp is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the observation is on the treated platform after the introduction of the monetary incentives and 0
otherwise. Regression estimates in Table 2.11 show that after the monetary incentive
program was introduced, previously highly rated products received significantly more
reviews, supporting our Hypothesis 5.
Table 2.11.: The impact of previous star ratings on the total number of reviews
Total number of reviews
ExAnteStaritp × Mtp
ExAnteStaritp

0.706*** (0.088)
-0.058 (0.055)

Number of new products

-0.203*** (0.021)

Alexa rank

0.039*** (0.012)

Constant

0.319*** (0.085)

Product Fixed Effects

Yes

Platform Fixed Effects

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

Yes

N

8,227

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by product.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01.

The next question is after selecting to review highly-rated products, what ratings
do the reviewers give. Using three months of data after the introduction of monetary
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incentives, Table 2.12 shows that average rating changes are larger when the ex-ante
averages are lower.
Table 2.12.: Change in the Star Rating
Range of Ex-ante

Average Change of the Given

Average Star Ratings

Star Ratings from the Ex-ante Average

[1,2)

3.3333*** (0.3333)

12

[2,3)

0.7524*** (0.1957)

33

[3,4)

0.5135*** (0.0442)

397

[4,5]

-0.0435*** (0.0122)

2,847

Number of Observations

Notes. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01.

The aforementioned results raise interesting questions about modeling the review
generation process. Consider the “brag-and-moan” model in Hu et al. (2006) which
assumes that reviewers gain more utility from writing extreme reviews. However,
they assume that the “entry costs” they face are independent of whether reviewer’s
experience is positive or negative. Our results indicate that such costs may not be
symmetric. In other words, the costs appear to be different when reviewer experience
is positive versus negative. Such a characterization is reminiscent of the Prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Overall, our findings indicate that although the monetary incentive program can
induce more reviewers to contribute to the platform and that the total number of
reviews increases, it appears to create a bias of a different kind. First, reviews are
more concentrated toward highly rated products compared with reviews posted before monetary incentives. Second, reviewers significantly deviate from previous star
ratings in a positive manner for products with low and medium ratings, while deviating negatively for highly rated products (however, the magnitude of this deviation
is very small). As a result, the platform sees an influx of reviews with 4 and 5 star
ratings, while reviews with 1 and 2 star ratings almost disappear. In other words,

44
the distribution of star ratings appears to shift from bimodal to unimodal as seen
in Figure 2.3. On a related point, it also appears that monetary incentives indeed
interact with reviewers’ intrinsic motivation and that the incentives do not simply
reduce the cost of writing reviews.

Figure 2.3.: The distribution of star ratings in the treated platform before and after
monetary incentives

Table 2.13.: Summary of results of the hypothesis tests
Hypothesis Hypothesized characteristics

Measures

Results

Length of reviews
1

Review helpfulness score

H1a supported

Readability score (Gunning-Fog index)

H1b not supported

Review quality
Frequency of feature-related discussions
Average star ratings

2

Review valence

Percentage of positive words

H2 supported

Percentage of negative words
Number of reviews
3

Existing reviewer behavior

Length of reviews

H3 partially supported

Review helpfulness score
4

Number of new reviewers

Number of new reviewers

H4 supported

Gini coefficient
Bias in selecting product
5

Number of reviews posted
to write review
based on ex-ante star ratings

H5 supported
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To recap, we present the analyses of several measures to test our hypotheses in
section 2.5. Table 2.13 summarizes our hypotheses, measures, and results. Overall, we
find that monetary incentives decrease review quality while review valence becomes
more positive. For existing reviewers, the incentives reduce their level of participation
while the quality of participation does not significantly change. Lastly, the platform
enjoys an increase in the number of new reviewers who register and contribute to the
review platform. However, reviews after monetary incentives are concentrated much
more toward highly-rated product.

2.6

Conclusion
Many review platforms provide monetary incentives to attract reviewers. These

incentives are provided to help reviewers overcome the cost of writing reviews, and
thereby help the platforms obtain reviews that are more representative of the diverse
experiences of the user population. However, extrinsic rewards may have unintended
consequences in a context where intrinsic motivation is paramount. Such issues could
negatively affect the platforms and exacerbate existing biases. We studied this problem by taking advantage of a naturally occurring experiment. We also obtained data
on another platform with no monetary incentives to serve as the control group. We
focused on the reviews of experience goods and used video game review data in our
analysis.6
Through our analysis, we find that by paying reviewers to write reviews, review
platform enjoys more participation at the cost of inflated star ratings and lowerquality reviews. As review platforms are likely concerned about the quality of their
reviews, using monetary incentives, at least the way they are commonly designed,
might not align with that objective. We also evaluated the effect of incentives on
the behavior of the existing reviewers. We find that monetary incentives result in
a decrease in their level of participation, but the quality of participation does not
6

To investigate the generlizeability of our findings, we also analyzed reviews of another category of
experience goods, movie DVDs, and confirmed that the primary results are qualitatively similar.
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significantly change. This finding is particularly important as it highlights the difference in behavior of two groups of users (i.e., existing reviewers and new reviewers).
Lastly, we find that as a result of the monetary incentives, reviewers’ bias in selecting
products is aggravated and reviews are even more concentrated toward products that
are already highly rated. Our analyses appear to indicate that the traditionally used
“brag-and-moan” model for consumer behavior should be revisited to account for the
asymmetric cost of writing reviews based on the current star ratings of the products.
Our paper contributes to the existing body of knowledge on the effect of incentives
on the review generation process. This is particularly important given that many companies are pursuing similar incentive models. Our findings could be utilized to draw
insights on similar incentive designs for other related contexts such as crowdsourcing
platforms. However, our analysis is not without limitations. We only consider the
reward structure that pays reviewers based on the number of reviews written, which
is the design commonly adopted by review platforms. However, a different reward
structure may generate a different outcome. For example, if the rewards are based on
the length or popularity of the reviews, the results may be different. Studying such
alternative mechanism designs is an interesting avenue for future research. Particularly, field experiments or laboratory experiments could be used to investigate other
mechanism designs. In addition, another avenue for future research is to study the
direct effect of incentives on sales. Also, as our work provides insights into the effect
of monetary incentives in the context of reviews of experience goods, another future
research avenue could be to explore whether such effects are similar for the reviews
of search goods.
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3. THE EFFECT OF QUESTION AND ANSWER
FEATURE ON SALES
3.1

Introduction
One of the major obstacles online marketplaces face is the lack of trust in the

eyes of consumers (Gefen et al., 2003). Previous literature has suggested several
solutions to alleviate this issue such as using third-party institutional mechanisms
(Pavlou and Gefen, 2004), developing a reputation system (Resnick et al., 2000), and
establishing online review platforms (Awad and Ragowsky, 2008). However, as the
competition has become increasingly intense, platforms are seeking new avenues to
attract consumers and differentiate themselves. One of the practices that becomes
popular recently is to embed a discussion system into the platform. For example,
Amazon.com introduced “Amazon Answer” to the website in 2012. This feature
allows users to ask and answer questions related to each individual item on the product
page. Many small and medium online platforms in Asia have started to adopt this
approach and even replace the standard online review system with it in many cases.
This paper studies the economic implications of such a system, particularly how the
question and answer elements affect product sales.
The facilitation of discussions among consumers is not new. In fact, online forum
is one of the most well-recognized services of the Web 2.0 era. Previous IS literature
has done extensive work in studying it. However, there are two main differences in the
focus of this paper compared to previous studies. First, the use of online discussion
forums examined in previous studies typically occurred in a selling-neutral setting
(e.g., Wasko and Faraj, 2005; Yan and Tan, 2014). There is a limited number of previous works that investigate the economic implications of online discussion platforms.
Second, in our context, the online discussion platform co-exists with the review plat-
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form, which has been shown to have a significant economic impact on its own (e.g.,
Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Zhu and Zhang, 2010). Our research question regarding
the economic implications of the online discussion system is particularly important
as this type of system has become increasingly popular among small and medium
emerging websites and online marketplaces. Although some websites provide both
systems to consumers, many choose to replace the typical online product review system with the question and answer system. At first glance, it appears that the latter
system is easier to manage as acquiring online reviews from consumers is well known
to be a difficult task for emerging websites. However, since the economic implications
of the question and answer system have not been thoroughly studied, managers are
left to rely on their own intuition to derive relative policies and managerial practices
to manage such a system.
At first glance, online discussion and online review are seemingly similar as both
are typically perceived to be a way for users to share their knowledge. However, their
theoretical foundations are drastically different. For one, the online review system is
typically a one-way communication where contributors express their opinions and experiences while the online discussion system is built mainly upon two-way interaction
between users (i.e., questioners and answerers). In addition, although both online review and online discussion could be considered as a type of electronic word of mouth,
such a notion is well-established in the literature only for online review. For example, Babić Rosario et al. (2016) conducted a meta analysis of the effect of electronic
word of mouth on sales from 96 studies. They did not include online discussion as
“electronic word of mouth” in their study. Therefore, even though the implication of
online review has been widely studied in the previous literature, the implication of an
online discussion system for economic outcomes, and for the online review platform
itself is not ex-ante clear and hence motivated our study. Furthermore, the content
shared on both systems is typically different. Online reviews normally contain more
generic content, with some degree of personal, customized opinions. On the other
hand, questions and answers are more specific in nature. They tend to be related to
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one (or more) specific function or feature of the product and do not involve much of
personal taste or experience.
We collected the data from Amazon.com and another online store between March
2015 and September 2015. Both stores are among the biggest online retailers in the
market. However, only Amazon offers both an online review system and a question
and answer system on its product page. Another store, on the other hand, only
offers a standard online review system. With this structure, we match products
on both platforms and then employ the difference-in-differences analysis to unveil
the impact of question and answer elements on product sales. The difference-indifferences analysis has been extensively used to study the economic implications of
online platform features such as online review elements (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin,
2006; Sun, 2012). In our case, it allows us to control for product characteristics that
remain the same over time. In addition, potential global-level endogeneity issues are
eliminated when differencing data across stores. We find that the impact of question
and answer elements on product sales is two-fold in general. Question elements appear
to negatively affect product sales, especially for popular products. Meanwhile, answer
elements seem to affect product sales in a positive manner. Interestingly, although
an increase in the number of questions hurts product sales, the fraction of questions
that have at least one answer has a positive impact on product sales. However, once
we focus the analysis only on the initial sales (sales on the first day), it turns out that
the number of questions and the fraction of questions with at least one answer both
positively impact sales. We also find an interaction between question and answer
elements and review elements. That is, an increase in the number of questions tends
to cause an increase in the number of reviews in the next period. Meanwhile, an
increase in the number of answers appears to reduce the average content word count
of reviews in the subsequent period. Our analysis suggests that the question and
answer system should not be simply implemented without proper planning, primarily
because of the negative impact of question elements. Therefore, if the store has too
many questions, especially unanswered ones, the existence of the question and answer
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system could actually hurt the store. On the other hand, if the store can manage
to have most (if not all) of the questions posted answered, and the depth of those
answers is appropriate, then this system could be particularly beneficial to the store.
In the next section, we survey previous literature related to our study. In Section
3.3, we develop and present our hypotheses. Section 3.4 discusses our dataset and
describes the details and summary statistics of the data we use in the empirical analysis. We then develop the specifications of our model in Section 3.5 and present our
regression results in Section 3.6. Lastly, We discuss our findings and the implications
of this study as well as the limitations and potential directions for future works in
Section 3.7.

3.2

Literature Review
In this section, we review previous literature related to our study. First, we explore

the literature that discusses the foundation and value creation in electronic commerce
platforms. Second, we present the survey of literature in the domain of the economic
implication of electronic word of mouth. Third, we review literature that studies
online discussions.

3.2.1

Electronic commerce platforms

Early IS literature on electronic commerce mostly focuses on value creation (e.g.,
Keeney, 1999). In that regard, Torkzadeh and Dhillon (2002) show that one of the
key elements to create value in consumers’ eyes is to build their trust, which has been
shown to have a strong impact on consumers’ satisfaction and purchase intention
(Fang et al., 2014). Several avenues are suggested for establishing such trust. For
example, Pavlou and Gefen (2004) propose that using third-party institutional-based
mechanisms (e.g., third-party escrow services) could help engendering trust in the
ecommerce platform. In addition, the reputation systems proposed by Resnick et al.
(2000) have been empirically shown to have a positive impact on consumers’ trust as
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well (Melnik and Alm, 2002). Furthermore, Pavlou and Dimoka (2006) argue that
textual content, in addition to numeric ratings from reputation systems, plays an
important role in developing trust. This finding is supported by Awad and Ragowsky
(2008), who find that textual content in online review systems can significant impact
trust, though effect is different across genders. Given a theoretical foundation of
textual content and online reviews in building consumer trust, we then proceed to
survey the literature that discusses their economic implications in the next subsection.

3.2.2

Economic implication of electronic word of mouth

In the previous subsection, we find a strong connection between the textual elements of online content and consumer trust in the literature. In this subsection, we
present the survey of prior works that show the economic impacts of textual content
in the context of electronic word of mouth.
Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) are among the first to investigate the impact of
online reviews on sales. They gather book reviews and sales ranks on Amazon and
Barnes and Noble’s website to analyze casual implications between review elements
and product sales. They find that review elements such as the number of reviews,
together with the prices, have a significant impact on sales. In addition, Zhu and
Zhang (2010) find that the impact of online reviews varies across product and consumer characteristics. For example, online reviews are more influential if a product is
less popular. Furthermore, Wu et al. (2015) employ the structural modeling approach
to investigate the economic value of online reviews using a dataset from a Chinese
online restaurant review platform. They find that online reviews have a significant
impact on the value of the restaurants.
Apart from the volume of the reviews, other review elements have also been shown
to be significantly valuable. For one, Chintagunta et al. (2010) studied the effect of
online reviews on movie box office performance. They find that the valence, not the
volume, seems to impact the performance of the movie in the designated market area.
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They argue that their findings can also be generalized to other products that are rolled
out sequentially. Additionally, Luca (2011) empirically studied the impact of online
consumer reviews on Yelp.com on restaurant demand. He finds that the numeric
star ratings on yelp can significantly affect a restaurant’s revenue. Furthermore, the
variance of the star ratings has also been found to affect sales in certain contexts as
well. Sun (2012) proposes an analytical model that explains the role of the variance
on sales. He then uses online book review data on Amazon to empirically demonstrate
that books with higher standard deviations of star ratings get a better sales rank if
they are unpopular (less than 4.1 star ratings). According to Lu et al. (2013), the
economic impact of online reviews is still significant in the presence of other marketing
promotions (e.g., online coupons).
Both theoretical models and empirical evidence have supported that electronic
word of mouth has a significant economic impact. However, most previous works
have only investigated the impact of electronic word of mouth in the context of online
reviews. Babić Rosario et al. (2016) summarize 96 previous studies in this stream of
research and find that the term “electronic word of mouth” is represented by either
online reviews or social media sharing (such as twitter). In this paper, our primary
objective is to show the economic impact of electronic word of mouth in the context of
online discussions that co-exist with an online review system. In the next subsection,
we review previous literature in the specific context of online discussion.

3.2.3

Online discussions

In this subsection, we review previous studies that examine online discussion systems and their economic implications.
Online discussion forums (or online communities, electronic networks of practice)
has been one of the most popular topics in the IS research community in the last
decade. It has been studied in many different contexts such as motivations for knowledge contribution (Wasko and Faraj, 2005), fraud detection and reporting (Chua
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et al., 2007), and the role of social mechanisms (Johnson et al., 2014). In terms of
value creation, online discussion has been shown to be extremely valuable for users
(Armstrong and Hagel, 2000). For example, Yan and Tan (2014) empirically show
that social support in discussion groups can be beneficial to participated patients. In
addition, Oestreicher-Singer and Zalmanson (2013) use data from Last.fm to show
that an increase in participation in an online community can actually increase consumers’ willingness to pay for the product related to that community.
Regarding the economic value, Bickart and Schindler (2001) provide an early foundation in the area by experimentally demonstrating that online forums are influential
sources of consumer information. Another stream of research that is closely related to
ours is in finance, where user generated content has been shown to significantly impact
stock performance (e.g., Tirunillai and Tellis, 2012). To the best of our knowledge,
our work is the first to provide a formal empirical analysis on the economic impact of
an online discussion system. In addition, the online discussion system in our study
co-exists with online review systems, thus enabling us to compare and contrast the
differences in different types of electronic word of mouth.
In sum, previous literature has extensively examined the implications of many
forms of electronic word-of-mouth. However, studies of the economic implications are
mostly limited to online reviews and social media contributions. Meanwhile, previous
works that investigated online discussion platforms largely focus on user participation
and the content of the discussion. To the best of our knowledge, our work is one
of the first research studies that empirically analyzes the economic implications of
online discussion systems, particularly the impact of question and answer elements
on product sales.

3.3

Hypothesis Development
In this section, we describe the context of our study and then develop and present

our hypotheses. We focus our study on online discussions and reviews that involve
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single-purchase products that are experience goods. Examples of these products are
books, music, and video games. Since observing the characteristics of these products
is difficult until product consumption occurs, electronic word of mouth such as online
reviews and discussions could be useful in helping potential consumers to make their
purchasing decisions.
Next, we develop our main hypotheses. The first variable of interest is the volume
of questions per product. The volume is an important element as previous literature has shown its significant impact on product sales (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006).
Therefore, as questions could be classified as a type of eWOM, we expect that the
volume of questions should have a significant impact on product sales as well. However, since there are limited prior works and theoretical background that could be
drawn to predict the direction of this relationship, we motivate this hypothesis as
an open empirical question. On the one hand, eWOM is likely correlated with the
popularity of products, and there is evidence in the literature that an increase in the
volume of eWOM is associated with an increases in sales (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Sun, 2012). Since questions in the Q&A platform are a form of eWOM,
we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1a An increase in the total number of questions results in higher sales.

On the other hand, Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the word “question” as
“Doubt or uncertainty about something.” Therefore, it possible that questions can
be perceived negatively by the readers. In addition, behavioral economics literature
has associated questions and concerns (Solnick and Hemenway, 1998). Furthermore,
a large number of questions has been shown to impose a negative sentiment and thus
deter potential participants (Im and Chee, 2004). If this effect is dominant,
Hypothesis 1b An increase in the total number of questions results in lower sales.
The second variable of interest is the volume of answers per product. In the
same way as Hypothesis 1a and 1b, this value captures the impact of eWOM on

55
product sales. However, since “answer” is defined by Merriam-Webster dictionary as
a response to a question, it is natural to expect that content associated with answers
contributes to clarification as opposed to creating doubt in the case of questions.
Therefore, we theorize that consumers perceive answers as positive sentiment. Hence,
Hypothesis 2 An increase in the total number of answers results in higher sales.
Our first two hypotheses focus on the volume of questions and answers, which
represent high-level measures of questions and answers in consumers’ eyes. In the
following hypotheses, we are interested in seeing the effect of the depth of questions
and answers on product sales. If the depth of questions and answers has a significant
effect, it could imply that consumers carefully consume the information in the question
and answer system and pay attention to details. On the other hand, if the depth of
questions and answers is not significant, then consumers merely use this system to
obtain some signals regarding the product. To measure the depth, we adopt an
approach employed in Mudambi and Schuff (2010) by using word count as a proxy
to measure the depth of eWOM of experience goods. An online discussion setting
naturally tends to create extensive engagement among users as asking and answering
questions requires non-negligible effort. Therefore, we expect users to pay attention
to the details of the question and answer system. Based on the explanations outlined
in the development of Hypothesis 1a, if the volume of questions is representative of
customers’ interest in the product, we anticipate the relationship between the question
depth and product sales to be similar to that between the volume of questions and
sales. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3a An increase in the depth of questions results in higher sales.
On the other hand, as outlined in the development of Hypothesis 1b, questions
could convey a negative signal as they might be associated with doubt and uncertainty
about the product, and thus:
Hypothesis 3b An increase in the depth of questions results in lower sales.

56
Since we expect to see the effect of the depth of questions on product sales, it is
natural to expect the depth of answers to have a significant effect on product sales as
well. We employ the same measurement by using answer word count as a proxy for
answer depth. We theorize that the depth has an effect on product sales using the
same rationale discussed in the development of the previous Hypothesis. However,
as mentioned in Hypothesis 2, answers are usually associated with a positive signal
in consumers’ perception, so we expect the direction of the effect of answer depth on
product sales to be the opposite of the effect of question depth on product sales. In
other words,
Hypothesis 4 An increase in the depth of answers results in higher sales.
Our last variable of interest is the fraction of questions that have answers. This
variable is of interest as it represents how many of the concerns raised by other consumers have already been addressed. Our previous hypotheses argue that questions
are usually associated with negative sentiment, thus having a negative impact on
product sales. However, it is important to note that if most (or all) of the questions
have some answers, then that fact could positively impact consumers’ perception as
well. Therefore, disregarding this variable could leave an important effect of question
and answer elements out of our analysis. When consumers observe that the fraction
of questions with answers increases, we expect them to perceive that more concerns
regarding the product have been addressed, which implies that the perceived risk of
acquiring the product is reduced. Therefore,
Hypothesis 5 An increase in the fraction of questions that have answers should
result in higher sales (i.e., lower sales rank).

3.4

Data Descriptions
Our dataset is collected from two retailers. The primary platform is Amazon.com,

which provides both a review system and a discussion system (“Amazon Answer”)
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together on the website. In this paper, we will refer to Amazon as “Platform A”.
Another platform (“Platform B”) is a large retailer which offers only a review system
on their website. Regarding the product type, we choose video games as they are
experience goods with a reasonably long product life cycle, so that our dataset contains both new and old products. In addition, they are also used in prior literature
in determining the effect of online reviews on sales (e.g., Zhu and Zhang, 2010). Furthermore, the video game category has a unique characteristic in that many products
in this category allow pre-ordering. Hence, these products are listed on the platform
long before their release date. In such a period, users are allowed to ask and answer
questions but cannot post reviews on these products. This characteristic does not
exist in other categories such as books or DVDs.
We start collecting our data by employing an automated script to obtain a list
of products in the video game category on both retailers. Then, for each product,
the script collects product characteristics, review elements, and question and answer
elements (only available on Amazon). In addition, for each product, the script also
acquires time-sensitive product details such as sales rank and price. All of the data are
collected on a daily basis. Details of collected product characteristics, review elements,
question and answer elements, and time-sensitive product details are provided in
Table 3.1, Table 3.2, Table 3.3, Table 3.4, and Table 3.5, respectively.

Table 3.1.: Product characteristics collected
ID

Unique identifier of the product

Product title

The title of the product

Platform

Gaming platform of the product (e.g. PlayStation 4)

Publisher

The publisher who officially publishes the product

Release Date

The official release date of the product
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Table 3.2.: Review elements collected
User ID

The unique identifier of the review writer

Title

The title of the review

Star rating

Rating (scale of 1 to 5) that the review writer gave to the product

Review date

The date the review was posted

Verified Purchaser

Identifier that the review writer bought the product
before submitting her review

Review content

The content of the review

Table 3.3.: Question elements collected
User ID

The unique identifier of the user who asks the question

Question content The content of the question
Question date

The date the question was posted

Table 3.4.: Answer elements collected
User ID

The unique identifier of the user who answers the question

Answer content The content of the answer
Answer date
Is seller

The date the answer was posted
Whether the user who answers the question is a seller
of the product in question or not

Answer score

The score voted by the readers
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Table 3.5.: Time-sensitive product details collected
Date

The date the data are collected

List price

The list price of the product

Sales price

The current price of the product

Sales rank

The sales rank of the product

We started collecting the data on March 1, 2015. Following that, we collected
the data every day until September 30, 2015. We removed invalid products such
as products that are incorrectly classified as a video game from our data set. In
addition, we removed duplicated products such as pre-own and digital versions of
the same product as well. The total number of products we collected from platform
A is 1,945 while there are 1,806 products on platform B. For those products, 891
products are matched across two platforms. On platform A, there are 266,376 reviews
from 192,836 users (excluding 457 anonymous reviews), 15,342 questions from 11,868
users, and 32,169 answers from 24,515 users. Meanwhile, on platform B, there are
101,468 reviews from 67,088 users. The summary statistics of price, sales rank, review
elements, and question and answer elements are presented in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7.
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Table 3.6.: Summary Statistics of the data collected from platform A (Cross-sectional,
per product)
Variable

Mean

Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.

Price

21.8492

0.01

Sales rank

748.99

30.5893

7,748.7178 1

1,021,885

22,417.1078

Number of reviews per product

135.8967

0

986

180.1284

Average star ratings

4.0722

1

5

0.6022

Average content word count

86.3714

2

709.50

61.1407

Number of questions per product

7.6992

0

115

11.0465

Average question word count

12.1548

3.50

42

3.9851

Number of answers per product

16.1887

0

249

25.6136

Average answer word count

22.6070

1

824

27.4209

Table 3.7.: Summary Statistics of the data collected from platform B (Cross-sectional,
per product)
Variable

Mean

Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.

Price

25.9575

0.99

Sales rank

399.99

24.4664

127,127.4171 20

400,606

129,258.2978

Number of reviews per product

56.0725

0

980

132.3278

Average star ratings

4.2347

1

5

0.6417

Average content word count

37.5335

10

254

21.7141

3.5

Model Specifications
In this section, we describe the specifications of the model we employed in our

analysis. Our primary variable of interest is the natural logarithm of sales rank of each
product sold on both platform A and platform B. We use log sales rank as a proxy for
log sales of those products due to data availability. Note that previous studies have
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shown that the relationship between log sales rank and log sales is close to linear
(e.g., Brynjolfsson et al., 2003; Schnapp and Allwine, 2001). Their findings imply
that if we are to use log sales as our dependent variable, the coefficients estimated
through our model (which uses log sales rank) could be simply scaled by a constant.
Therefore, although log sales would be an ideal dependent variable, log sales rank is
also an appropriate dependent variable in our study as well.
To measure the effect of question and answer elements on sales, we first have
to consider the potential issues of endogeneity and simultaneity. For example, some
product characteristics (e.g., product quality) are typically unobservable to researchers
but could be correlated with our dependent variable. Previous literature that studies
the economic impact of electronic word of mouth has proposed several methods to
address these issues. In this paper, we adopt the difference-in-differences approach,
which is used extensively to unveil the effect of online review elements on product
sales (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Sun, 2012; Zhu and Zhang, 2010). It is also
widely used to establish causal arguments in other contexts when endogeneity issues
are presented as well (e.g., Chan and Ghose, 2014).
Consider product i that is available on both platforms. Its sales rank on platform
A is a function of a product-platform fixed effect (µi ), a product fixed effect (νi,t ), a
price (P ricei ), review elements (ReviewElementsi,t−1 ) which consists of average star
ratings and the natural logarithm of the total number of reviews up to the last period,
the average word count of reviews up to the last period (AvgReviewLengthi,t−1 ),
lagged total number of questions (N umQuestioni,t−1 ), lagged total number of answers
(N umAnsweri,t−1 ), the average word count of questions posted up to the previous
period (AvgQuestionLengthi,t−1 ), the average word count of answers posted up to
the previous period (AvgAnswerLength), and a fraction of questions with answers
A
with one period lagged F racQuestionW ithAnsweri,t−1
. Note that the question and

answer elements only exist on platform A. Next, we adopt the specification used
in Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) by allowing prices and review elements from one
platform to affect sales on another platform. Also, as Zhu and Zhang (2010) show
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that the popularity of the product also plays an important role in moderating the
effect of numeric electronic word of mouth variables on sales, we include product
popularity as an interaction term here as well. We define that product i is popular at
time t if its sales rank at that time is lower than 1,000. This definition is consistent
with the definition specified by platform A. Furthermore, we vary this definition in
the robustness test and find that our results are robust. Therefore, a dummy variable
populari,t indicates whether a product is popular. Hence,

A
A
A
A
B
ln(SalesRanki,t
) = µA
i + νi,t + α0 + α1 ln(P ricei,t ) + α2 ln(P ricei,t )
A
B
+ α3A (ReviewElementsA
i,t−1 ) + α4 (ReviewElementsi,t−1 )
B
A
+ α5A (AvgReviewLengthA
i,t−1 ) + α6 (AvgReviewLengthi,t−1 )
A
A
+ α7A ln(N umQuestionA
i,t−1 ) + α8 ln(N umAnsweri,t−1 )
A
A
+ α9A (AvgQuestionLengthA
i,t−1 ) + α10 (AvgAnswerLengthi,t−1 )
A
A
+ α11
(F racQuestionW ithAnsweri,t−1
)
A
A
B
+ α12
(ln(P riceA
i,t ) × populari,t ) + α13 (ln(P ricei,t ) × populari,t )
A
(ReviewElementsA
+ α14
i,t−1 × populari,t )
A
+ α15
(ReviewElementsB
i,t−1 × populari,t )
A
+ α16
(N umQuestionA
i,t−1 × populari,t )
A
A
+ α17
(N umAnsweri,t−1
× populari,t ) + A
i,t .

B
B
A
B
B
ln(SalesRanki,t
) = µB
i + νi,t + α0 + α1 ln(P ricei,t ) + α2 ln(P ricei,t )
B
B
+ α3B (ReviewElementsA
i,t−1 ) + α4 (ReviewElementsi,t−1 )
B
B
+ α5B (AvgReviewLengthA
i,t−1 ) + α6 (AvgReviewLengthi,t−1 )
B
B
+ α7B (ln(P riceA
i,t ) × populari,t ) + α8 (ln(P ricei,t ) × populari,t )

+ α9B (ReviewElementsA
i,t−1 × populari,t )
B
B
(ReviewElementsB
+ α10
i,t−1 × populari,t ) + i,t .
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We then eliminate the product fixed effect by differencing the data across platforms:
B
∆ln(SalesRanki,t ) = ∆µi + β1 ln(P riceA
i,t ) + β2 ln(P ricei,t )
B
+ β3 (ReviewElementsA
i,t−1 ) + β4 (ReviewElementsi,t−1 )
B
+ β5 (AvgReviewLengthA
i,t−1 ) + β6 (AvgReviewLengthi,t−1 )
A
+ β7 ln(N umQuestionA
i,t−1 ) + β8 ln(N umAnsweri,t−1 )
A
+ β9 (AvgQuestionLengthA
i,t−1 ) + β10 (AvgAnswerLengthi,t−1 )
A
+ β1 1(F racQuestionW ithAnsweri,t−1
)
B
+ β12 (ln(P riceA
i,t ) × populari,t ) + β13 (ln(P ricei,t ) × populari,t )

+ β14 (ReviewElementsA
i,t−1 × populari,t )
+ β15 (ReviewElementsB
i,t−1 × populari,t )
+ β16 (N umQuestionA
i,t−1 × populari,t )
A
+ β17 (N umAnsweri,t−1
× populari,t ) + i,t ,

where
B
∆µi = µA
i − µi .
A
B
∆ln(SalesRanki,t ) = ln(SalesRanki,t
) − ln(SalesRanki,t
).
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Following that, we eliminate the product-platform fixed effect by differencing the data
across time. Hence, our final specification is:
B
∆∆ln(SalesRanki,t ) = β1 ∆ln(P riceA
i,t ) + β2 ∆ln(P ricei,t )

+ β3 ∆(ReviewElementsA
i,t−1 )
+ β4 ∆(ReviewElementsB
i,t−1 )
+ β5 ∆(AvgReviewLengthA
i,t−1 )
+ β6 ∆(AvgReviewLengthB
i,t−1 )
+ β7 ∆ln(N umQuestionA
i,t−1 )
A
+ β8 ∆ln(N umAnsweri,t−1
)

+ β9 ∆AvgQuestionLengthA
i,t−1 )
+ β10 ∆AvgAnswerLengthA
i,t−1 )
A
+ β1 1∆(F racQuestionW ithAnsweri,t−1
)

+ β12 ∆(ln(P riceA
i,t ) × populari,t )
+ β13 ∆(ln(P riceB
i,t ) × populari,t )
+ β14 ∆(ReviewElementsA
i,t−1 × populari,t )
+ β15 ∆(ReviewElementsB
i,t−1 × populari,t )
+ β16 ∆(N umQuestionA
i,t−1 × populari,t )
A
+ β17 ∆(N umAnsweri,t−1
× populari,t ) + i,t .

Based on our specifications, we construct our dataset into a panel dataset such
that each observation corresponds to a product, and each time period is a calendar
month. Note that although we have 7 months of data in total, we lose one month in
the lagged independent variables construction and another month when differencing
the data across time. Therefore, our final panel dataset consists of 891 products and
5 time periods.
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3.6

Empirical Results

3.6.1

The Effect of Question and Answer Elements on Sales

In this subsection, we present results from our empirical analysis specified in
Section 3.5. We begin by testing for serial correlations on our outcome variable
(i.e. the difference in sales rank differences) using the package XTSERIAL in STATA
(Drukker et al., 2003), which implements the method proposed by Wooldridge (2010).
We do not find evidence that our dependent variable has a significant first-order
serial correlation (F-value 0.033 with p-value 0.8549). Therefore, we employ the
standard panel data model in our analysis. Table 3.8 presents the regression results
of the difference-in-differences specification. In Model 1, we use the difference-indifferences approach to investigate the effect of price and review elements on sales.
In Model 2, we include question and answer elements to the model but leave the
interactions between product popularity and price, total number of reviews, questions,
and answers. In Model 3, we add those interaction terms to the model. Recall that
our dependent variable is the difference of differences sales ranks on both platforms
B
A
B
A
))). Therefore, when the
) − ln(ranki,t
)) − (ln(ranki,t
) − ln(ranki,t+1
(i.e., (ln(ranki,t+1

effect of sales is positive (i.e., product sales increases), our dependent variable will
decrease (as the sales rank decreases).
We find that the effect of price on sales is significant. When a product price on
platform A increases, the relative sales rank of that product also increases. In the
same way, when a product price on platform B increases, the relative sales rank of
that product decreases. These results imply that consumers in this market compare
product prices across platforms in a purchasing decision process. Interestingly, on
average, the effect of platform B’s price to product sales “cross-platform effect” is
much stronger than the effect of the price on platform A “direct effect”. One possible
explanation is that platform A acts as a default platform in this market, hence consumers are less sensitive to the price in the platform. However, for platform B, price
is an important factor for the consumers to shop on the platform, thus consumers are
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Table 3.8.: The effect of question and answer elements on sales
(1)

(2)

(3)

∆ ln(price) (A)

.0869*** (.0338)

.2004*** (.0492)

.1461*** (.0512)

∆ ln(price) (B)

-.4697*** (.1218) -.7116*** (.1041) -.5617*** (.1340)

∆ average star ratings (A)

-.0561 (.1766)

.1084 (.1827)

.0518 (.2217)

∆ average star ratings (B)

.2250 (.1808)

.3853* (.2011)

.4453** (.2177)

∆ ln(total no. of reviews) (A)

.2725 (.1720)

-.0550 (.1750)

.4315* (.2351)

∆ ln(total no. of reviews) (B)

-.2154* (.1141)

-.1845* (.1061)

-.4761*** (.1709)

∆ avg. review word count (A)

.0004 (.0009)

-.0004 (.0010)

.0001 (.0011)

∆ avg. review word count (B)

-.0004 (.0037)

-.0041 (.0054)

-.0033 (.0057)

∆ ln(total no. of questions) (A)

.1880 (.1543)

.0892 (.1807)

∆ avg. question word count (A)

.0305** (.0140)

.0254* (.0141)

∆ ln(total no. of answers) (A)

-.1134 (.1199)

-.1425 (.1442)

∆ avg. answer word count (A)

-.0116*** (.0038)

-.0132*** (.0039)

∆ fraction of questions with answers (A)

-.7970** (.3840)

-.7243* (.4005)

∆ ln(price) × popular (A)

.5967 *** (.1671)

.5136*** (.1725)

∆ ln(price) × popular (B)

-.4703 ** (.2021)

-.3938* (.2104)

∆ avg. star ratings × popular (A)

-.0372 (.3412)

.0949 (.4021)

∆ avg. star ratings × popular (B)

-.0618 (.4773)

-.1677 (.5694)

∆ ln(total no. of reviews) × popular (A)

-.3990* (.2076)

-.9467*** (.2706)

∆ ln(total no. of reviews) × popular (B)

.1361 (.1475)

.5162** (.2021)

∆ ln(total no. of questions) × popular (A)

.8028* (.3536)

∆ ln(total no. of answers) × popular (A)

-.0090 (.2031)

Intercept

-.0188 (.0126)

-.0236* (.0129)

-.0249 (.0144)

N

2,176

1,893

1,893

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

more sensitive to the price there. Another alternative explanation is that platform
B is better at communicating price promotion (e.g., product price deceases) to consumers than platform A. Therefore, when the price on platform B decreases while the
price on platform A remains the same, the effect on sales is much higher than a case
in which the price on platform A decreases while the price on platform B remains
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the same. In addition, when we separate products into popular and less popular,
we find that the effect of price on both platforms to the relative sales is similar for
popular products. However, for less popular products, the price on platform B has
a much stronger effect on the relative sales than the price on platform A. At first
glance, our finding may appear to be different from results in the previous literature.
For example, Zhu and Zhang (2010). find that product price is less elastic for sales
of popular product. However, it is important to note that our dependent variable is
drastically different from that of Zhu and Zhang (2010). In their case, they investigate the effect of product price on the aggregate level of product sales (i.e., total
sales of the product). They find that, on average, the effect of price on sales is less
impactful for popular products. In our case, we examine a competition between two
platforms. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that for popular products (which
have high demand by nature), the effect of prices on relative sales is more impactful
since consumers switch the purchase from one platform to another platform where a
lower price is offered.
In addition, we discover that the effects of an increase in review elements, which
includes average star ratings, total number of reviews, and average review depth,
on product sales are not particularly strong. First, the direct effect of average star
ratings is insignificant for both popular and less popular products. However, the
cross-platform effect is negative and statistically significant for less popular products.
Second, for popular products, the direct effect of the total number of reviews on sales
is positive (i.e., the higher the total number of reviews on platform A, the higher the
relative sales of platform A compared to platform B) and the cross-platform effect
of the total number of reviews on sales is negative. However, these effects are in an
opposite direction for less popular products. In other words, the higher the total
number of reviews on platform A actually hurts sales on platform A while the higher
the total number of reviews on platform B actually helps sales on platform A. Third,
the effect of the depth of reviews on sales is insignificant for both direct and crossplatform. Our findings suggest that consumers indeed consume online reviews from
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more than one platform when developing a purchasing decision. They also support
the previous findings by Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) that, on average, the crossplatform effect of the total number of reviews on sales appears to be positive. It is
also worth noting that although the negative direct effect of total reviews on sales for
less popular products may appear to be counter-intuitive, it is not new as noted in
the meta-study of online reviews (Babić Rosario et al., 2016).
Next, we find that the effects of question and answer elements on product sales
mostly align with our hypotheses. First, the effect of total questions on sales is
negative as theorized. However, it is not statistically significant for products on
average and for less popular products. The effect is only significant for popular
products. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b is partially supported. Second, the direction of
the effect of total answers on sales is positive, which is also in line with our hypothesis.
However, this effect is not statistically significant in any of the cases. Interestingly, the
effect of total answers for less popular products is much stronger than that for popular
products, but it is also not statistically significant. Third, an increase in average
question depth has a negative effect on sales, hence Hypothesis 3b is supported. Also,
Hypothesis 4 is supported as we find that an increase in average answer depth has
a positive effect on sales. Furthermore, an increase in the fraction of questions with
answers has a positive impact on sales. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is also statistically
supported.
Our findings regarding the effect of question and answer elements are particularly
interesting and insightful. We find that the question and answer system has a potential economic impact on the online shopping platform. However, such an economic
impact is mixed as question elements appear to have a negative impact on sales while
answer elements tend to have a positive impact. Furthermore, even though the number of questions negatively affects sales, an increase in a fraction of questions with
answers actually affects sales in a positive manner. Additionally, users of the question and answer system appear to pay attention to details rather than rely only on
overall statistics. We observe that both the average depth of questions and answers
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have a significant effect on sales while the total number of questions and answers do
not, except for the case of total number of questions for popular products. However, the summary statistics do play a role when it comes to a fraction of questions
with answers as its increase could positively affect sales. Therefore, implementing
the question and answer system on an online shopping platform must be carefully
planned and executed as its effect is two-fold. If the system is half-done (e.g., there
are many questions on the system but a relatively low number of answers) then the
presence of the question and answer system could actually hurt the bottom line of
the platform. However, if the system is implemented appropriately (e.g., there are
a wide-range of answers and most of the questions are answered) then the economic
impact of the system could be positively significant as intended. With the question
and answer system, platform managers should make sure that the technical environment supports user interaction with the system, especially for answering questions.
In the same way, there should be mechanisms in place to encourage users to answer
questions, especially questions without answers.

3.6.2

The Effect of Question and Answer Elements on Initial Sales

Next, we continue our analysis to investigate the effect of question and answer
elements on initial sales. It is worth highlighting that unlike reviews, questions regarding a product can be asked and answered even before that product becomes
available. Hence, we direct our focus of this subsection on the effect of question and
answer elements on product sales during the first day of the product release. The
specification for this analysis is as follows:
∆ln(SalesRanki ) = β0 + β1 ∆ln(P ricei ) + β2 (N umQuestioni )
+ β3 (N umAnsweri )
+ β4 (AvgQuestionLengthi ) + β5 (AvgAnswerLengthi )
+ β6 (F racQuestionW ithAnsweri ) + i ,
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where ∆SalesRanki is the difference in the sales rank of product i between two platforms on the first day of the product release, ∆ln(P ricei ) is the difference in the price
of product i between platforms (after applying the natural logarithm), N umQuestioni
and N umAnsweri are the number of questions and answers product i has on Amazon prior to the release date, AvgQuestionLengthi and AvgAnswerLengthi are the
average word count of those questions and answers, and F racQuestionW ithAnsweri
is the total number of questions that have at least one answer by the total number of
questions.
Our dataset contains products that were released between March and September
2015. Although there are 109 products in total, 12 of them do not have any questions
posted on Amazon before the release date. In addition, only 59 products have at least
one question on Amazon and a positive initial sales rank on both platforms.
Table 3.9.: The effect of question and answer elements on initial sales
∆ln(SalesRanki )

∆ ln(Price)

-3.4377 (2.8411)

NumQuestion

-0.0144* (0.0079)

NumAnswer

0.0183 (0.0259)

AvgQuestionLength

0.0191 (0.0344)

AvgAnswerLength

0.0008 (0.0011)

FracQuestionWithAnswer

-1.1116*** (0.4012)

Intercept

-4.1487*** (0.5181)

N

59

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

The results of our analysis are shown in Table 3.9. Interestingly, we find that the
number of questions posted before the release date positively correlates with a lower
sales rank (i.e., higher sales) although the relationship is only marginal. However,
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the correlation between the fraction of questions with answers and the sales rank is
particularly strong. That is, the more questions that were posted before the initial
sales that have at least one answer, the higher initial sales the product attains.

3.6.3

The Effect of Question and Answer Elements on Reviews

In this subsection, we shift our focus to examine the relationship between the
Q&A system and the traditional review system. We reconstruct our dataset to be
a panel dataset at a product level with monthly observations between March and
September 2015. However, we instead use the total number of reviews and average
review word count as dependent variables in this analysis. Our specifications are as
follows:
∆∆ln(N umReviewi,t ) = β0 + β1 ∆ln(N umQuestioni,t−1 )
+ β2 ∆ln(N umAnsweri,t−1 )
+ β3 ∆AvgQuestionLengthi,t−1
+ β4 ∆AvgAnswerLengthi,t−1
+ β5 M onthSinceReleasei + i,t ,

∆∆AvgReviewLengthi,t = β0 + β1 ∆ln(N umQuestioni,t−1 )
+ β2 ∆ln(N umAnsweri,t−1 )
+ β3 ∆AvgQuestionLengthi,t−1
+ β4 ∆AvgAnswerLengthi,t−1
+ β5 M onthSinceReleasei + i,t ,
where ∆∆ln(N umReviewi,t ) is the difference between the time and the platform of the total number of reviews for product i after taking the natural logarithm,
∆∆AvgReviewLengthi,t is the difference between the time and the platform of the
average review word count for product i, and N umQuestioni,t−1 , N umAnsweri,t−1 ,
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AvgQuestionLengthi,t−1 , and AvgAnswerLengthi,t−1 are all lagged variables. Lastly,
M onthSinceReleasei denotes the number of months since the release of product i.
Table 3.10.: The effect of question and answer elements on review elements
(1)

(2)

∆∆ ln(NumReview)

∆∆ AvgReviewLength

∆ ln(NumQuestion)

1.4634** (0.6712)

-2.7461 (3.4000)

∆ ln(NumAnswer)

0.4586 (0.4274)

-6.2972*** (2.2240)

∆ AvgQuestionLength

0.0411 (0.0758)

-0.0711 (0.3552)

∆ AvgAnswerLength

-0.0023 (0.0049)

0.1206 (0.0951)

MonthSinceRelease

-0.0117*** (0.0029)

0.0827*** (0.0181)

Intercept

-0.3368*** (0.0835)

-3.6590*** (0.5515)

N

3720

2467

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 3.10 shows our regression results. We find that an increase in the number
of questions in the previous period is positively correlated with an increase in the
number of reviews in the following period. Meanwhile, an increase in the number
of answers in the previous period negatively influences review word counts in the
following period. Our findings in this section yield an interesting insight into the
interaction between the Q&A system and the traditional review system. That is,
the questions could stimulate users in the platform to share their experience on the
online review systems. However, as questions attract more answers, the following
online reviews tend to be shorter.
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3.7

Discussion and Conclusion
In recent years, many websites and online marketplaces have started to offer a

question and answer system, which allows consumers to ask and answer questions
regarding the product, in addition to the standard online review system. At first
glance, the Q&A system appears to be a good addition to the platform as it can
be considered another form of electronic word of mouth, which has been shown to
have a positive impact on product sales. However, it is also possible that the Q&A
system could cannibalize the online review system and thus eventually impact sales in
a negative direction instead. Since previous literature has only a limited discussion of
the economic implications of an online discussion system, we are motivated to study
this problem. We collect data from two online marketplaces, one of which offers its
customers both a Q&A system and an online review system while the other one only
offers a standard online review system.
Our main analysis shows that the effect of a question and answer system on
sales is two-fold. Question elements, particularly average question depth, appear
to negatively impact product sales while the total number of questions only hurts
sales of popular products. Meanwhile, the average depth of answers positively affects
product sales while the total number of answers does not have any significant impact
on sales. Furthermore, fixing question and answer elements, an increase in the fraction
of questions with at least one answer significantly affect sales in a positive direction.
As we investigate further into the effect of the Q&A system on initial sales, we find
that the number of questions positively affects initial sales, even though the effect is
only marginal. More importantly, the effect of the fraction of questions with answers
on initial sales is significant and positive. Lastly, we examine the influence of question
and answer elements on review elements. Interestingly, an increase in the number of
questions positively affect the number of reviews in the following period. Meanwhile,
an increase in the number of answers is correlated with a decrease in review word
counts in the following period. Therefore, it appears that the question and answer
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system is greatly used by consumers in their purchasing decision process. Consumers
in an early purchase cycle seem to direct their focus to “summary variables” such
as the total number of questions and the fraction of questions that have at least one
answer, thus only those variables have a positive impact on initial sales. However,
in the longer run, customers tend to pay attention to the details of questions and
answers, particularly the depth of those discussions, as evidenced by the support of
our hypotheses 3b and 4 instead. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the sales
could be negatively affected in two scenarios. First, if there are too many questions
for popular products. Second, if the number of questions without answers is too high.
Our study yields relevant and insightful managerial implications. As many emerging websites and online marketplaces have started to adopt the question and answer
system, we show that the Q&A system must be managed appropriately to attain
intended results. For instance, the platform could actually be better off without the
Q&A system if it manages to attract questions but fails to obtain answers to those
questions. We also demonstrate that the number of questions and answers are not
as important as their depth in terms of the effect on product sales. Hence, platform
managers have to be careful in constructing an incentive policy to attract consumers
to participate in this system. Our work also contributes to the body of literature on
the economics of information systems, specifically in the context of online discussion
and electronic commerce. We are the first to offer empirical evidence of the economic values of an online discussion feature. In addition, we also empirically present
an interaction between question and answer elements and online review elements.
our results could be extrapolated to other related contexts such as crowdsourcing
and electronic word of mouth if they share the same characteristics (e.g., experience
goods) as well.
Finally, we conclude our work by discussing some limitations and potential avenues
for future research. Our work use sales rank as the main dependent variable as it is
available to the public. Although previous literature has established that sales rank
tends to have a linear relationship with sales, it would be ideal to have sales as the

75
main dependent variable. Second, our work focuses only on the implication of Q&A
elements on the sales of experience goods. One potential extension would be to study
if our results hold for search goods and identify if any specific product characteristics
could moderate the influence of Q&A elements. Third, although our analysis does
not include textual content analysis of the questions and answers as they tend to
be very brief, an interesting extension would be to study how question and answer
elements influence the textual content of product reviews. Lastly, another valuable
addition to our paper would be to study the behavioral side of the question and
answer system. Particularly, studies that develop consumer behavior theories on how
consumers adopt questions and answers into their purchase decision process.
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4. THE EFFECT OF INCENTIVE POLICY ON
TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS
4.1

Introduction
Two-sided platforms have become a stage for new websites and technologies to

interact with users in recent years. Famous two-sided platforms such as Uber, Airbnb,
and Alibaba have already changed and continue to change the competition landscape
and significantly shape related organizations and societies by enhancing the efficiency
and effectiveness of the current business model, transforming business operations, and
even disrupting the industries they belong to. As in a typical technology-based market, this seemingly unlimited potential attracts newcomers and increases competition.
While the incumbents are busy managing the platforms and trying to stay ahead, the
new players are struggling with how to “launch” their product. Particularly, as the
platforms start their operations, it is of the utmost important for them to attract
users from one side of the platform. Reaching the critical mass is crucial as it alone
could determine whether the platform survives (Evans and Schmalensee, 2010).
A common practice that the platforms employ to appeal to their users is to offer
incentives. For instance, when entering a new area, Uber not only offers free ride
credits to riders who join the ride-sharing platform in that area but also provides signup and performance bonuses for local drivers. Through this practice, Uber manages
to attract users from both sides of the platform to join its program. On the other
hand, several platforms such as eBay have chosen to incentivize only one side of the
market. In the case of eBay, the increasing number of bidders could work as an
inherent incentive to attract sellers to join its auction platform.
This paper studies the economic implications of an incentive policy in two-sided
platforms. Specifically, we construct a game-theoretic model such that the platform
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owner acts as an intermediary that buys products from one side of the market and
sells to another side. The platform owner has to make a decision on the incentive
policy in order to attract one side of the market to participate in the platform. We
are interested in the implications of this incentive policy on user behavior and welfare
metrics. We find that although the platform can always obtain a greater amount of
participation quality by increasing the amount of incentive, the incentive allocation
policy is also equally important to the platform. In some cases, the platform can attain
higher participation quality without increasing the amount of incentive. Furthermore,
there exists a “win-win” region where both the platform and the sellers can be better
off with the change of incentive allocation policy. This paper provides a starting point
to investigate the implications of incentive policies in a two-sided platform setting.

4.2

Literature Review
Two-sided platform has become a burgeoning discussion topic in the literature in

recent years. It refers to a platform that allows two different groups of consumers
to interact, and the key success factor of this platform is to acquire and keep both
of them on board (Evans, 2003). Research regarding two-sided platforms is closely
related to the network externality literature where the primary focus is to identify the
network effect in different scenarios as well as the difference between direct and indirect network effects (e.g., Liebowitz and Margolis, 1994; Clements, 2004). Rochet and
Tirole (2003) are among the first to establish the field of two-sided market research.
They model a platform competition with two-sided markets and show the differences
in price allocation and consumer surplus based on various governance structures.
They also provide additional analyses regarding the role of users and membership
externalities in their subsequent work (Rochet and Tirole, 2006). Weyl (2010) develops a general demand model in a monopoly setting similar to Rochet and Tirole
(2006) but with a different model of heterogeneity. His model predicts the effect of
price regulation and merger as well as offers an avenue to derive a measure of market
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power. For IS literature, previous research that studied two-sided platforms usually
examine two-sided platforms as a context. For example, Parker and Van Alstyne
(2005) examine the case of information product design. They show that with the
two-sided network externalities, firms can be profitable even though they give away
free products. Furthermore, there exist cases where consumer welfare and firm profits
increase together. In addition, Anderson Jr. et al. (2013) build a model to investigate the trade-off decision of the platform owner between increasing the investment
to ensure high performance of the platform and reducing it to facilitate developments
from third parties. They show that heavily investing to attain a high performance
platform is not always a winning strategy. In some cases, the platform is better off
lowering the performance while providing greater availability of content.
As for consumer behavior in two-sided platforms, multihoming behavior is one
of the most well-researched behaviors in the context of two-sided markets. This behavior is crucial as it could affect other behaviors and strategies in the platform
(e.g., Jin and Rysman, 2015). Armstrong (2006) provides a framework to study the
relationship between different platform structures and consumer behavior on multihoming. He finds that the size of cross-group externalities, the structure of the
fee imposed, and consumer multihoming behavior are key factors in determining the
equilibrium price. Doganoglu and Wright (2006) investigate the relationship between
consumers’ multihoming behavior and firms’ compatibility policies. They find that
multihoming behavior could weaken competition and impose additional costs on the
firms. Also, policymakers should be concerned about the lack of compatibility when
consumers multihome. Corts and Lederman (2009) study the effect of multihoming
video game software on indirect network effects. They show that the existence of
non-exclusive video games (e.g., video games that are available on multiple gaming
platforms) induces indirect network effects. Therefore, a larger number of consumers
on one gaming platform can positively affect the consumption level of other gaming
platforms as well. Landsman and Stremersch (2011) examine a case in which both
seller-level and platform-level multihoming exist. They show that multihoming can
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cause both positive and negative impacts on the platform sales. The platform-level
one negatively impacts sales but such an effect dissipates when the platform becomes
mature. Meanwhile, the seller on a mature platform would try to multihome more
when the market share of the platform is larger. Armstrong and Wright (2007) offer
an analysis of two-sided platforms that allow each side of the market to have a different degree of product differentiation. They identify a case in which the platforms
choose to not compete directly for sellers but rather compete indirectly by subsidizing
buyers to join instead. This scenario arises as a result of agents’ perception of the
degree of differentiation and the use of exclusive contracts to prevent multihoming
behavior could be a solution.
Following Armstrong and Wright (2007), several papers have started analyzing
platform owners’ strategies for managing platforms with two-sided markets. Rochet
and Tirole (2008) investigate the implications of tying policy in the context of payment card processing. They show that tying arrangements can actually raise social
welfare in many cases. Also, Choi (2010) examines the effect of tying arrangements
on competition and welfare metrics. He shows that tying arrangements can enhance
social welfare when multihoming behavior is allowed. Apart from tying, exclusive
contracts are also widely studied. Doganoglu and Wright (2010) analyze a case in
which the market owner uses exclusive contracts to create a barrier to entry. They
show that an incumbent platform can prevent more efficient newcomers from entering the market by using introductory offers that force customers to commit to not
purchasing from the other platforms. However, the use of such exclusive contracts
is socially inefficient. Prieger and Hu (2006) examine whether exclusive contracts of
video game software have anticompetitive properties. They use data from the U.S.
video game industry to show that exclusive contracts rarely work as a barrier to entry
in the U.S. video game market. They also apply the same model to analyze the case
of the Japanese video game market and reach the same conclusion as well.
Our work extends the previous literature that investigates platform owners’ strategies for managing a two-sided platform. We examine a specific case in which the
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platform owner faces a decision to offer different levels of incentives to attract agents
on one side of the market and the quality of the products that are generated by agents
on this side will affect another side of the market. Our game theoretic model provides
insights into the incentive practices and strategies that the platform owners could use
to attract agents and attain their desired results.

4.3

Model
Our model features three primary players: The single monopolistic platform, buy-

ers, and sellers. The platform in this model acts as an intermediary as it buys products
from sellers and sells them to buyers. Each seller may nominate one and only one
product to be considered by the platform. After the platform buys all of the qualified
products, they sell those products to the buyers. We assume that there is no direct
monetary charge to participate in the platform on both sides.

Figure 4.1.: The interaction between players on the platform.

Figure 4.1 illustrates the interaction between players on the platform. This research primarily focuses on the interaction between the platform owner and the sellers.
In particularly, we are interested in how the the incentive policies set by the platform
affect the behavior and welfare of the sellers.
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At the beginning of the game, the platform announces w, the number of products
the platform is willing to buy, and r, the amount of reward payable to each seller
whose product is selected by the platform. These two variables are the primary
variables of interest in this work as they represent the platform’s incentive policy
to attract and maintain sellers’ interest. r represents the total amount of incentive
the platform offers, while w represents the incentive allocation policy the platform
employs. The primary research question is how the change in r and w affect seller
behavior and welfare metrics.
On the seller side, each seller i has a different cost parameter θi , which is uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1 across sellers. After realizing their own cost parameter
and observing the rewards allocation policy w, the amount of rewards r, and the
number of sellers in the market n, each seller makes a decision regarding the effort
level ki to spend in creating their own product. Following that, each seller nominates
a product with quality qi to the platform. The quality of the product is a function of
ki and a stochastic term i . The cost of putting effort ki is c(ki ; θi ) which is assumed
to be convex in k i . Finally, after all sellers nominate their product to the platform,
the platform chooses w highest quality products and awards them the total amount
of r (i.e., each seller whose product is selected receives r/w). Any ties that occur
during the product selection phase are decided by a flip of a fair coin.

4.4

Equilibrium Results
We first direct our attention to characterize the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium

for the game between sellers and the platform. At this stage, the seller decides on the
effort level based on the number of winners w, the amount of reward r, the number
of sellers n, and their own cost parameter θi .
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Let Q be the set of the quality of the products nominated by each seller and Q̂i
be the set of the quality of the products nominated by each seller excluding seller i.
Q = (q1 , q2 , ..., qn ),

(4.1)

Q̂i = Q/qi .

(4.2)

The product nominated by seller i would be chosen by the platform if no more
than w − 1 members of Q̂i have a higher quality than qi . Therefore, the expected
profit of each seller who chooses the effort level ki with cost parameter θi is:
n
o r
t
− θi ki2 ,
Eπi (ki ; θi ) = P qi > Q̂i(n−(w−1)) |ki ·
wt

(4.3)

where Q̂i(n−(w−1)) is the n − (w − 1)th order statistics of Q̂. The second term is the
cost function and the first term is the probability that the product is chosen by the
platform (i.e., the probability that the quality of the product seller i nominates is
within the top w of all products) multiplied by the rewards. Assuming symmetric
equilibrium, this probability can be characterized as:
w−1  
n
o X
n
i
P qi > Q̂(n−(w−1)) |ki =
(1 − P {qi > q−i |ki })j P {qi > q−i|ki }n−j .
j
j=0

(4.4)

Let the quality function that determine qi be:
qi = ki + i ,

(4.5)

i ∼ N (µ, σ).

(4.6)

Hence, P {qi > q−i } can be characterized as:
Z θ=1
Φ−i −i (ki − k−i (θ−i )) dF (θ−i ),

(4.7)

θ=0

where k−i is the effort level used by other sellers.
Observation 1 Users with higher cost parameters attain less expected profit as they
increase the level of effort.
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Figure 4.2.: Expected profit of users with θ equal to 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9. The number of
players (n) is 10, the number of winners (w) is 2, the amount of rewards (r) is 1,000.
µ and σ is set to be 0 and 200.

Figure 4.2 plots the expected profit with respect to the effort level of users with
the cost parameter θ equal to 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9. Intuitively, we observe that users with
higher cost parameters obtain less expected profit compared to those with lower cost
parameters when they increase their level of effort. In addition, we also observe that
the expected profit is a concave function of the level of effort for all users regardless
of the cost parameters associated with them.
Observation 2 The equilibrium effort of users increases as the amount of rewards
increases regardless of the cost parameters.
We next direct our focus to the platform’s incentive policy. Specifically, we investigate how the change in the incentive policy affects the sellers on the platform.
First, we examine a case in which the platform changes the amount of rewards r that
will be given to the sellers whose products are chosen. Intuitively, as the amount of
reward increases, the expected profit of the sellers increases, thus inducing all sellers
to increase their effort level regardless of the cost parameter θ. Figure 4.3 shows
the plot of the equilibrium effort level with respect to the cost parameter θ when
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the amount of reward r is 500, 1,000, and 1,500. From the plot, it is clear that the
equilibrium effort level is higher when the amount of reward is higher for all sellers.

Figure 4.3.: User equilibrium effort level when the amount of rewards is 500, 1,000,
and 1,500. The number of players (n) is 10, the number of winners (w) is 2. µ and σ
is set to be 0 and 200.

Observation 3 The equilibrium effort of users is concave in the number of winners
regardless of the cost parameter.
When the platform increases the number of winners w, the relationship between
the expected profit and the number of winners is not as straightforward as the case
of the amount of rewards. Figure 4.4 plots the equilibrium effort level among all
users with different cost parameters. From the graph, the effort level is the lowest
when there is only one winner (w=1). Meanwhile, the effort level increases when the
number of winners is 4 but decreases again when the number of winners is 7. Figure
4.5 illustrates the equilibrium effort level of users with a cost parameter θ 0.1, 0.5,
and 0.9. The equilibrium effort level of users appears to be a concave function of the
number of winners. Also, it is worth noting that users with a low cost parameter
have a larger gap between the highest and lowest effort level compared to users with
a high cost parameter.

85

Figure 4.4.: User equilibrium effort level when the number of winners is 1, 4, and 7.
The number of players (n) is 10, the amount of rewards (r) is 1,000. µ and σ is set
to be 0 and 200.

Figure 4.5.: The equilibrium effort level of users with a cost parameter θ equal to 0.1,
0.5, and 0.9. The number of players (n) is 10, the amount of rewards (r) is 1,000. µ
and σ is set to be 0 and 200.

Observation 4 The expected quality of the products the platform receives is concave
in the number of winners.
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Next, we are interested in the expected quality of the product that the platform
attains with its incentive policy. In general cases, this expected quality can represent
the platform welfare as the platform would be better off if it attains better quality
products. Since it is obvious from Observation 2 that an increase in amount of reward
r would increase the expected quality, we only study the effect of the change in the
number of winners w.
As the platform might receive more than one product (based on the choice of w),
we present both the expected highest and expected average quality of the products
the platform receives. Figure 4.6 plots the expected highest and expected average
quality with respect to the number of winners w. The change in expected quality
with respect to the number of winners appears to be similar between the expected
highest quality and the expected average quality. Also, it is worth noting that the
change in the expected quality is along the same lines as the change in the equilibrium
effort level when the number of winners w changes.

Figure 4.6.: Expected highest quality and expected average quality the platform
attains at a given number of winners. The number of players (n) is 10, the amount
of rewards (r) is 1,000. µ and σ is set to be 0 and 200.
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Lastly, we examine how the change in the incentive allocation policy affects the
welfare of the sellers. We calculate the seller surplus as the sum of expected profit of
all sellers when they select the equilibrium effort level.
Observation 5 The seller surplus is concave in the number of winners.
Figure 4.7 shows the plot of the seller surplus with respect to the number of
winners selected by the platform. As the number of winners increases, we observe
that sellers are better off as the seller surplus also increases. However, the increase
in seller surplus becomes negative as the number of winners approaches the total
number of sellers. Therefore, it appears that even though the higher number of
winners increases the probability of winning among sellers, it might not be helpful
to the sellers if the incentive allocation policy is too lenient. That is because a too
lenient policy induces sellers to spend too little effort in developing the product, thus
lowering the chance of their products being selected.

Figure 4.7.: The seller surplus given the number of winners. The number of players
(n) is 10, the amount of rewards (r) is 1,000. µ and σ is set to be 0 and 200.

Observation 6 There exists a case in which both both the sellers and the platform
are better off as the number of winners increases.
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Interestingly, Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 reveal the region where both the seller
surplus and the expected quality of the products the platform receives increase as the
number of winners increases. Specifically, as the number of winners increases from 1
to 5, both seller surplus and expected product quality increase together. However,
after the number of winners reaches 5, an increase in the number of winners only
raises the seller surplus but not the expected product quality. Recall that the change
in the number of winners does not affect the amount of incentive paid by the platform,
and that the expected product quality can represent the platform welfare generally,
this finding demonstrates that the decision regarding the incentive allocation policy
is not less important than the choice of the amount of incentive as it can increase
both the well-being of the platform and the sellers in many cases.

4.5

Conclusion
The two-sided platform has become one of the most successful business models

in recent years. Its primary strength lies the network effect between the two sides
involved. As each side of the platform grows, the platform enjoys not only the direct
benefit to the platform itself but also the positive effect that influences another side of
the platform as well. However, it is also crucial for the platform owner to manage each
side of the market appropriately. The platform decision is especially important during
the early stages of the formation of two-sided platforms, which typically involves the
use of incentives to appeal to potential users and encourage their participation from
one or both sides of the platform. The use of incentives has been proven to be
effective in attracting users in many cases such as Uber, Airbnb, and iTunes. This
paper studies the implications of platforms’ incentive policies. Particularly, we are
interested in how the amount of incentive and the incentive allocation policy set by
the platform owner affect user behavior and welfare metrics.
We develop a game-theoretic model that features three players: the platform
owner, sellers, and buyers. In the model, the platform owner acts as an intermediary
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who purchases products from the sellers and sells them to the buyers. Our focus is
on the seller-platform side as we investigate how the choice of platform’s incentive
policy influences users’ effort level and eventually the expected quality of the products
the platform receives and the welfare metrics. We find that, intuitively, the sellers’
expected profit and effort level increase as the amount of incentive increases. As a
result, the expected quality the platform receives and seller surplus increase with the
amount of incentive as well. Meanwhile, sellers’ effort level, the expected quality the
platform receives, and seller surplus are concave in the number of winners selected
by the platform. Interestingly, there exists a region where both expected quality and
seller surplus increase with the number of winners, which implies that the change in
incentive allocation policy can benefit both the sellers and the platform. Our findings
provide insights into the implications of incentive policies in the two-sided platform
setting. It shows that in some cases, optimizing the incentive allocation policy can
increase the well-being of the platform without spending more to raise the amount
of incentive. Our model is also a starting point to analyze the incentive policy in
the two-sided platform setting. Two interesting extensions include endogenizing the
number of sellers on the platform by allowing them to join or leave the platform based
on their expected profit, and characterizing the platform-buyer interaction. By doing
so, the impact of the incentive policy on the welfare of another side of the platform
and social welfare can be analyzed.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
With the increasing competition in online marketplaces, players in the market have
sought potential avenues to create a value proposition to stay ahead of their opponents. This dissertation uses both empirical and theoretical research methodologies
to analyze the implications of three different policies/technologies that the platforms
employ to generate value. Our work provides significant contribution to the economics
of information system, online reviews, and two-sided platform literature. In addition,
we discuss meaningful managerial insights regarding the economic and behavioral implications that could be useful for practitioners who aim to adopt incentive policies
and new technologies in their platform to attract new customers and enhance the
platform experience as well.
In Chapter 2, we investigate the implications of monetary incentives for writing
online reviews. The research problem is important as firms have considered various forms of incentives for writing reviews, including the use of extrinsic rewards,
to attract reviewers. We use data from two platforms and treat them as a natural
experiment. Specifically, we use the difference-in-differences approach to compare
empirically the quantity and quality of reviews before and after rewards were introduced in the treated platform. We find that reviews are significantly more positive
but the quality decreases. Using the panel data model, we also evaluate the effect of
rewards on existing reviewers, who may be considered to be intrinsically motivated.
We find that they reduce their level of participation after monetary incentives but
the quality of participation does not significantly change. Lastly, the platform enjoys an increase in the number of new reviewers who register and contribute to the
platform. However, it suffers from a review concentration bias as reviews are written
more for highly rated products. Also, the distribution of the star ratings shifts from
bimodal before monetary incentives to unimodal afterward. This work provides the
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first empirical evidence of the effect of monetary incentives on the review generation
process. It is particularly insightful given that many companies are pursuing similar
incentive models. One may be able to extrapolate our results to the implication of
providing incentives to encourage participation in a crowdsourcing context as well.
In Chapter 3, we study the economic value of a question and answer system when
it co-exists with a standard online review system. Particularly, we are interested in
how the question and answer elements impact product sales and online reviews. We
collect the data from two different online marketplaces and leverage the difference-indifferences analysis to examine the effect of question and answer elements on product
sales. We find that question elements have a negative impact on sales while answer
elements, particularly the depth of the answers, have a positive impact on sales.
However, as we focus on the initial sales, it turns out that the number of questions
and the fraction of questions that have at least one answer positively influence the
sales. We also find that there is an interaction between Q&A elements and review
elements in that an increase in the number of questions positively affects the number
of reviews in the following period. Meanwhile, an increase in the number of answers
reduces the average length of reviews in the subsequent period. These findings yield
significant insights on how two consumer-related features interact with each other
and their effect on product sales. Also, managers could use our findings to develop
appropriate policies to gather necessary answers to questions asked on the platform
in order to capitalize on such a system.
In Chapter 4, we examine the implications of the incentive policies on the two-sided
platform. Specifically, we seek to understand how the incentive policies employed by
the platform owner affect user behavior and welfare metrics. We find that although
sellers will always be better off when the platform increases the amount of incentive,
the similar results can be attained with an adjustment of the incentive allocation
policy in many cases. Also, there exists a scenario where both the platform and sellers
can be better off without raising the amount of incentive. Our work contributes to the
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literature in two-sided platform. It also provides managerial insights on appropriate
incentive policies under different scenarios.
In conclusion, this dissertation employs various research methodologies such as
difference-in-differences analysis, panel data model, and game-theoretic model to analyze the implication of value creation practices in online marketplaces. We provide
insights on how policies and technologies such as monetary incentives and question
and answer systems affect user behavior and the platform itself. Our work contributes
to both the literature and business practice. As the online marketplaces continue to
grow, the insights from our work could help managers to develop an optimal policy
and procedure to maintain and improve their platform.
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A. Propensity Score Matching
In our analysis, we conduct propensity score matching to match reviewers on the
treated and control platform. In this appendix, we provide additional details regarding the matching method we use and the summary statistics of our explanatory
variables.

A.1

Procedure

Our propensity score matching procedures are as follows:
1. We calculate the propensity score for each observation i using the logit regression:
P (xi ) = P (Ti |Xi )
where Ti = 1 if the observation is in the treated platform and Ti = 0 if it is in
the control platform. Xi is a vector of explanatory variables.
2. Choose the matched counterpart for each observation i:
Li = {j = {1, ..., N }|Dj = 1 − Di , |Pi − Pj | ≤ di }
where the distance di is the lowest.
3. Construct the outcome of i under no treatment and under the treatment




yj if Di = 1
yi if Di = 1
y0i =
and y1i =


yi if Di = 0
yj if Di = 0
4. Calculate the Average Treatment Effect
τAT E

N
1 X
=
(y1i − y0i )
N n=1
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A.2

Propensity Score Matching on Number of Reviews Posted by Existing Reviewers

In the first part of section 2.5.2, we use propensity score matching to match reviewers on the treated platform with those on the control platform based on the number of
reviews posted before monetary incentives. Since we remove reviews posted in April
2013 from our dataset to ensure that the effect we observe is only an immediate effect,
the explanatory variables for our matching model are the number of reviews posted
between January and March 2013. Recall that the time period is semi-monthly (i.e.,
t=1 is the first half of January), the summary statistics are as follows:

Table A.1.: Summary statistics for the number of reviews posted on the treated
platform (per reviewer)
t=1

t=2

t=3

t=4

t=5

t=6

t=9

t=10

t=11

t=12

t=13

t=14

Min

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Max

3

5

4

10

6

3

1

2

1

4

2

1

Average

0.0532 0.6172 0.1046 0.0887 0.1363 0.1298 0.0047 0.0047 0.0028 0.0112 0.0028 0.0009

Std. Dev.

0.2557 0.6183 0.3463 0.4351 0.4259 0.3604 0.0682 0.0807 0.0529 0.1881 0.0683 0.0306

Table A.2.: Summary statistics for the number of reviews posted on the control
platform (per reviewer)
t=1

t=2

t=3

t=4

t=5

t=6

t=9

t=10

t=11

t=12

t=13

t=14

Min

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Max

6

17

8

11

9

10

5

6

13

5

5

6

Average

0.2235 0.1812 0.1473 0.1321 0.1493 0.1652 0.0101 0.0088 0.0108 0.0107 0.0089 0.0091

Std. Dev.

0.5323 0.5090 0.4579 0.4330 0.4874 0.4947 0.1243 0.1350 0.1668 0.1351 0.1233 0.1321
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A.3

Propensity Score Matching on The Depth of Reviews Posted by
Existing Reviewers

In the second part of section 2.5.2, we use propensity score matching to match
reviewers between the two platforms by using the average title and content word
count of reviews posted before monetary incentives. The summary statistics of the
explanatory variables used in the matching model are as follows:
Table A.3.: Summary statistics for the average title and content word count of reviews
posted on the treated platform (per reviewer)
Before Monetary Incentives

After Monetary Incentives

Min

1

2

Max

11

11

Average

4.48

4.76

Std. Dev.

2.32

2.23

Min

3

13

Max

522

211.25

Average

45.62

71.50

Std. Dev.

50.77

57.81

Average Title Word Count

Average Content Word Count

Table A.4.: Summary statistics for the average title and content word count of reviews
posted on the control platform (per reviewer)
Before Monetary Incentives

After Monetary Incentives

Min

1

1

Max

26

11

Average

3.71

4.19

Std. Dev.

2.89

2.83

Min

19

20

Max

1,462

1,262

Average

91.97

131.32

Std. Dev.

159.74

197.18

Average Title Word Count

Average Content Word Count
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